



U.S. Department  
of Transportation

Research and  
Special Programs  
Administration

---

**TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT  
AND SECURITY DURING  
THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION**

U.S. Department of Transportation  
John A. Volpe National  
Transportation Systems Center  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

January 5, 2005

*Prepared for*  
U.S. Department of Transportation  
ITS Joint Program Office  
and  
Federal Highway Administration  
Office of Transportation Operations

---



# TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DURING THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

---

Allan J. DeBlasio  
Terrance J. Regan  
Margaret E. Zirker  
Joshua Hassol  
Craig Austin

January 2005

*Prepared by*  
U.S. Department of Transportation  
Research and Special Programs Administration  
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

*Prepared for*  
U.S. Department of Transportation  
Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office  
and  
Federal Highway Administration  
Office of Transportation Operations  
Washington, D.C.

---



## FOREWORD

The purpose of the study documented in this report was to determine how transportation planning for special events is best conducted when mobility considerations are subordinated to security priorities. The subject of this study was the 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC), held in Boston, Massachusetts, from July 26 through July 29, 2004. This event was designated a National Special Security Event by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security. This designation established the U.S. Secret Service as the lead agency because security measures would take precedence over other actions, such as providing mobility to delegates and residents. The role of transportation agencies was to implement procedures that would accommodate the security measures developed for the convention.

This report documents actions taken by transportation and security agencies in preparation for and during the 2004 DNC. The findings documented in this report are a result of a series of interviews held before and after the convention as well as data collected during the week the convention was held.

This report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation's (U.S. DOT) John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for the U.S. DOT's Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office and the Federal Highway Administration Office of Operations. The Volpe Center study team consisted of Allan J. DeBlasio from the Volpe Center's Planning and Policy Analysis Division, the project manager; Terrance J. Regan from Planners Collaborative; Josh Hassol and Craig Austin from EG&G Technical Services; and Margaret E. Zirker from Cambridge Systematics Inc. Vince Pearce is the U.S. DOT task manager of the review.



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>XI</b>
<b>Site Selection</b>	<b>XI</b>
<b>Pre-event Planning</b>	<b>XII</b>
<b>Operations Plan</b>	<b>XII</b>
<b>Effect on the Transportation System</b>	<b>XIII</b>
<b>Aftermath</b>	<b>XIV</b>
<b>Findings and Observations</b>	<b>XIV</b>
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>XVII</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2. OVERVIEW OF THE BOSTON AREA TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1 Highways	2
2.2 Public Transportation	4
2.3 Intercity Rail	5
2.4 Passenger Air	5
2.5 Waterways	5
<b>3. PRE-EVENT PLANNING</b>	<b>6</b>
3.1 Site Selection:	6
3.2 Initial Planning Focuses on Mobility	7
3.3 Security Concerns Alter the Plan	7
3.4 Traffic Models Present a Challenging Goal	9
<b>4. OPERATIONS PLAN</b>	<b>11</b>
4.1 Building Flexibility into the Plan	11
4.2 Highways	13

<b>4.3 Public Transportation</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>4.4 Intercity Rail</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>4.5 Passenger Air</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>4.6 Waterways</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>4.7 Physical Security Measures</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>4.8 Transportation Operations Centers</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>4.9 Highway Signing</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>4.10 Video System</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>4.11 Traveler Information</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>5. EFFECT ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>5.1 Impact on Traffic Volumes</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>5.2 Impact on Transit Ridership</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>5.3 Impact on Waterborne Ridership</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>5.4 Impact on Air Travel</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>6. AFTERMATH</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>7. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>7.1 Security</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>7.2 Relationships</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>7.3 Operations</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>7.4 Communication with the Public</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>7.5 Role of Technology</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>8. CONCLUSION</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>APPENDICES</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Appendix A. List of Acronyms and Terms</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Appendix B. Chronology</b>	<b>47</b>

<b>Appendix C. Model Scenario Maps</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>Appendix D. Agencies Represented in the Study</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Appendix E. SmartRoutes</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Appendix F. Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System (MIVIS)</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Appendix G. Incident Command System and Unified Command</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Appendix H. MBTA Ridership During the DNC</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Appendix I. NSSE Designations by DHS</b>	<b>66</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure ES-1. Changes in Daily Traffic Volumes .....	XIV
Figure 1. Regional highway system.....	3
Figure 2. Map of MBTA Rapid Transit Lines .....	4
Figure 3 The FleetCenter with the Zakim Bridge behind it .....	6
Figure 4. Quick Kurb on I-93 .....	11
Figure 5: Roadway closings in Boston area .....	14
Figure 6. Summary of transit and waterway restrictions during the DNC .....	15
Figure 7. MBTA commuter rail routes from North Station.....	15
Figure 8. Sand truck blocking street near FleetCenter .....	16
Figure 9. VMS advertising cell phone number for SmarTravler.....	18
Figure 10. Changes in Traffic Volume .....	19
Figure 11. Tobin Bridge repairs.....	30
Figure 12. Temporary highway sign .....	31
Figure 13. Cover of an MBTA brochure announcing service changes .....	33
Figure 14. BostonWalk map.....	33
Figure 15. SmarTraveler telephone daily usage, July 2004 .....	35
Figure 16. SmarTraveler Website usage, 2001 – 2004 .....	35
Figure 17. MBTA’s mobile emergency response vehicle.....	37
Figure 18. Video cameras mounted on traffic signal mast.....	38
Figure 19. Camera used for MIVIS.....	40
Figure 20. ICS Organizational Chart .....	64

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Daily Ridership for MBTA During Week of the DNC.....	21
Table 2. MBTA Website Visits, July 2003 and 2004.....	36
Table 3: SmarTraveler Monthly Telephone Usage, 1998-2004.....	58
Table 4: SmarTraveler Monthly Web Usage, 2001 to 2004.....	59





## Executive Summary

The transportation operations plan for the 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Boston, Massachusetts, was not a typical transportation plan driven by goals such as mobility and air quality. The DNC was the first national political convention to be held since September 11, 2001. Therefore, it was the first such event for which security priorities took preference over mobility considerations. This report primarily focuses on how transportation officials responded to the security concerns of local, state, and federal safety officials, and how they designed and managed the operations of the transportation system during the convention.

As transportation agencies learn to operate in a new security environment, the 2004 DNC provides a compelling case for study. Despite the complexity and scale of the task, transportation management and operations in Boston worked without major problems during the convention week. This report presents lessons learned from Boston's experience:

- Security must be a primary consideration during site selection
- Interagency relationship-building must be facilitated and accommodated in the timetable
- Collaboration and clear leadership are equally important
- Special events can inspire and mobilize staff to accomplish technical and management breakthroughs
- All other preparation is meaningless if the public does not receive the right information at the right time
- Technology is key to monitoring situations, sharing information, managing operations, responding to incidents, and making critical decisions.

As well, certain approaches taken in Boston may provide long-lasting benefits to the region. Relationships formed during this effort are expected to enhance day-to-day operations as well as future planned or unplanned events. In addition, the DNC provided the managers of multiple agencies a perfect venue to integrate their technology with other agencies and to build on that integration for future expansion of the ITS architecture for the Boston region.

## Site Selection

The location chosen for the convention was the FleetCenter, a multipurpose sports facility located in downtown Boston. From the standpoint of mobility, the FleetCenter was well sited to provide excellent transit and roadway access for the convention. The FleetCenter houses one of Boston's two commuter rail terminals, North Station; two of the region's four subway lines run underneath the building; and the Center is adjacent to I-93, the Central Artery, and the Zakim Bridge. But from a security standpoint, as planners would later learn, the site presented a host of serious problems.

In May 2003, the U. S. Department of Homeland Security designated the DNC a National Special Security Event (NSSE), which established the U.S. Secret Service as the lead federal agency responsible for security. This was the first event to be so designated in Boston, and planners were faced with accommodating the mobility needs of the region's residents and the convention visitors while ensuring security for the event. The ultimate resolution required

closing portions of the transportation infrastructure and imposing transportation access restrictions rarely seen before in Boston.

## **Pre-event Planning**

Developing a regional transportation plan for the DNC was complex because it involved multiple agencies, often with overlapping jurisdictions and priorities. Staff at many of these agencies were not accustomed to working closely with staff at other agencies in the course of day-to-day operations, and political turf battles often arose at the senior levels of the various agencies.

Even before the city of Boston and the DNC formalized the agreement to host the convention, transportation-related planning for the DNC had begun. The public officials, traffic engineers, and planners at the various transportation agencies were working to ensure mobility to accommodate the additional demand the convention and its delegates would place on the existing transportation infrastructure. Security was always a concern, but not a primary driving force early in the process.

By late 2003, however, the security officials, including representatives from the U.S. Secret Service, the Massachusetts State Police, and the Boston Police Department, reinforced the need for heightened security to the transportation agencies and the city of Boston officials. It was now apparent that the transportation operations plan for the DNC was not going to be a typical transportation management plan. Rather, it was to be a response to a security plan. The U.S. Secret Service set a hard-and-fast deadline for the road closures during convention hours: by 7:00 p.m. each evening, I-93 adjacent to the FleetCenter was to be closed and free of all non-official vehicles. Restrictions were also going to be placed on access to North Station, which would severely impact transit operations. As Mr. William Bent, MassHighway State Traffic Engineer stated, “The DNC plan was, ‘this [road closure] is what’s going to happen, and you come up with the best solutions to it.’” Officials also needed to plan for the unexpected. It was unknown what types of protest or other unforeseen actions might occur that would require a closure or diversion at a moment’s notice.

Development of the operations plan was slow and painstaking, because there were numerous state, local, and regional agencies involved, and there was no single person with final authority over the plan. In order to ensure interagency coordination in the design of a management and operations plan, the DNC Host Committee convened a weekly meeting, beginning in late 2003, of all interested transportation and security officials. Attendees were decision-makers and heads of operations for the various agencies, which allowed decisions and adjustments to be made quickly. Ultimately, the representatives of the various transportation and security entities pulled together, putting aside their differing organizational habits and working collaboratively.

## **Operations Plan**

To respond to the security requirements imposed by the U.S. Secret Service, transportation planners determined that roadway traffic in the area would need to be reduced by at least 50 percent leading up to the convention time each night in order to prevent total gridlock. Although the plan required that the restrictions be in place around the FleetCenter by 7:00 p.m., the transportation officials and security officials tried to develop a plan that emphasized flexibility. All resources would be put in place to close down portions of the system leading up to the

FleetCenter as early as 4:00 p.m., but the actual decision on when to close the various components was left up to the Massachusetts State Police officer in charge. This ability to take action when needed but to remain flexible was key to the plan's success.

The operations plan designated 40 miles of roadway to be closed or restricted during the p.m. peak period, with restrictions extending approximately 10 miles north and south of downtown Boston on I-93 and to the west on the Massachusetts Turnpike and Memorial Drive and Storrow Drive. Although the majority of restrictions were centered around the FleetCenter, the impact of the closures extended much farther. To a large extent this was intentional. Planners wanted to locate the closure or detour points at places that diverted traffic onto roads that were familiar to most drivers, and that had sufficient capacity to handle the additional traffic.


Closing the North Station area to public transit required the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) and private transit carriers to adjust their services. Five commuter rail lines were stopped north of Boston and two subway lines were "expressed" through the area without stopping. Amtrak suspended service on its Downeaster train from Portland, Maine.

A key component of the plan was to inform the public of the diversions and restrictions as quickly as possible. Public officials mounted a widespread communications effort using a combination of the media and their own efforts to give the public as much information as possible so that Boston-area residents could make informed decisions.

## **Effect on the Transportation System**

Although the U.S. Secret Service had imposed an absolute requirement that I-93 adjacent to the FleetCenter be totally free of all unauthorized vehicles by 7:00 p.m., the state and city officials had designed their traffic response plan to maximize their flexibility in shutting down sections of the highway and diverting traffic to minimize disruption to travelers.

The public communications efforts that transportation officials made in the weeks and months prior to the DNC paid off. MassHighway traffic data show that total traffic volumes declined significantly while the DNC was convened. Moreover, those commuters who did drive into Boston changed their travel patterns: they came to work and went home much earlier than usual to avoid the anticipated traffic jams as I-93 closures took effect. The figure below, Figure ES-1, presents the changes in daily traffic volume on I-93 north of the city.



**Figure ES-1. Changes in Daily Traffic Volumes**

The DNC had only a moderate effect on ridership levels of most transit modes during the convention. It did, however, have a significant effect on ridership patterns: transit riders on all modes shifted their commuting times and traveled into and out of Boston earlier than usual. In many cases, employers changed work hours for the week of the DNC and allowed employees to work at other offices or to telecommute. A table of transit ridership patterns during the week is contained in Appendix H.

### Aftermath

After the culmination of the DNC on Thursday, July 29, 2004, the transportation system in the Boston region quickly returned to normal. On Friday, July 30, 2004, the day after the convention, traffic conditions were slightly less than normal because of the number of people who had chosen to take the week off. By the next Monday, all travel restrictions were lifted and travel patterns had returned to conditions normally seen in the summer.

### Findings and Observations

This review produced a number of findings and observations that may benefit transportation officials across the country as they plan for major, large-scale events in their region. The findings have been grouped into five categories: Security, Relationships, Operations, Communications, and Technology.

## Security

**Security considerations must now play a larger role in the site selection process for any large-scale event, and especially for an NSSE.**

Senior security officials at the local, state, and federal levels must be involved in the decision making process and begin work with the transportation agencies at the earliest planning stages. While the FleetCenter's location was excellent from a transportation standpoint, it presented significant security issues that resulted in the imposition of transportation restrictions throughout the region. Many interviewees stated that if the full implications of security needs had been considered earlier in the process, the FleetCenter would not have been chosen as the site for the convention.

**The role of transportation in an NSSE has changed: security officials define the desired outcomes, and transportation officials and planners must figure out how to achieve them.**

The heightened security requirements since September 11 have changed the way transportation planning is conducted for major events. Security needs are driving the planning process now, and many of the security-related goals require transportation officials and planners to do things they have never done before. Moreover, the process is decidedly top-down. For the 2004 DNC, the security officials requested certain outcomes and the transportation officials were charged with developing a management and operations plan to accomplish those outcomes. This give-and-take interaction between security and transportation staffs played out over the course of 18 months.

## Relationships

**Interagency relationships based on mutual trust and understanding are key to success. Forming such relationships among disparate groups takes considerable time and effort, so it is important to begin the planning process as early as possible.**

Many interviewees stated that 18 months was not enough time to properly plan for the convention. All the interviewees (federal, state, and local) stressed the importance of early planning, consistent and appropriate agency participation in that planning, and regularly scheduled meetings.

- Many of the federal players had not worked with state or local officials; even the locals were often strangers to each other. Moreover, some agency staffs had occasionally been adversaries. Building trust among such disparate players takes time. So does the recognition of partnering opportunities – a full inventory of all available resources should happen early.
- Transportation engineers and security officials initially had conflicting missions, different perspectives, and opposing priorities. It took many protracted meetings over 18 months to understand each other's needs and requirements.
- There was no clear regional leader in charge of all of plan components. The Mayor of Boston, Thomas Menino, was clearly the leader for the city and its responsibilities. Many of the transportation operations, however, fell to state agencies and authorities. Weekly high-level meetings beginning late in 2003 helped to accelerate coordination among the various agencies.

**Apart from having a designated leader, it is crucial for a region to have a unified command structure in place to respond to unexpected events.**

While many entities established command posts, it was not clear which command post would have been in charge if a major incident had occurred. A DNC debriefing by a state working group recommended that the Incident Command System and Unified Command be used to minimize confusion of command and control by all agencies.

## **Operations**

**A special event can produce long-term benefits for day-to-day transportation operations.**

The complex challenges of the 2004 DNC forced various agencies and their staff to work together in ways that had not occurred in the past. Transportation and security agencies practiced and refined security activities, and different levels of staff and management learned to work better together. Several interviewees commented that the bonds formed before and during the convention are helping them to resolve day-to-day transportation issues since the convention.

**The pressure of preparing for a special event can inspire agencies to accomplish missions more quickly than under normal circumstances.**

The unique security and mobility demands of the DNC, along with the hard-and-fast July 29, 2004 deadline, forced transportation agencies to be innovative. This innovation took many forms, including the cooperation of numerous agencies to speed the deployment of a new intelligent transportation system (ITS) video-sharing project and to integrate previously unconnected systems.

**In addition, an agency can use a forced closure to its advantage.**

While major portions of the transportation system were closed, several of the transportation organizations took the opportunity to either maintain or improve infrastructure. Officials at Massport used the closure of the Tobin Bridge as an opportunity to perform maintenance on the bridge decks and lighting upgrades.

## **Communications**

**All other preparations for a special event are meaningless if the traveling public is not well informed ahead of time about what to expect and what their choices are.**

The pre-planning modeling had made it clear that the only way the security constraints were going to work was if 50 percent of the driving public could be persuaded to commute by other means. Officials encouraged the use of public transit, commuting to other office locations, shifting commuting times, and telecommuting.

In the case of the DNC, two sets of information were essential. First, the public needed information to convince themselves about the absolute necessity of changing travel patterns to avoid gridlock and public safety problems. Second, in order to revise their travel plans accordingly, the public needed information about the changes in transportation services, including road closures, diversions, and transit-service changes as well as suspended and new or expanded alternative services.

**Numerous types of technology should be used to communicate to the public before and during the event.**

The various agencies used existing ITS technology installed over the past two decades to better inform the public. This included the use of both permanent and temporary variable message signs, highway advisory radio, static sign boards, and an expansion of services from SmarTraveler, which provides real-time traffic information to the Boston traveling public under a contract with MassHighway.

## **Technology**

**Operations centers allow officials to better manage operations and response activities.**

For the DNC, these centers included permanent centers, temporary centers operated solely for the convention, emergency centers that are only activated during emergencies or large-scale events, and mobile command units that can be driven to a scene. Because the convention week was uneventful, the operations centers were not tested under extreme conditions. Each of the centers had its own role to play, and there was communication among the centers. But one concern raised by a number of officials interviewed is that too many agencies operated their own command post or operations center. One state official expressed a concern that “if a major incident occurred, it was not clear which command post would take the lead.”

**Technology allowed officials to monitor situations and broadcast information in real time, allowing for better decision making.**

Several types of installed technology that help officials better manage the day-to-day transportation system were extremely useful during the DNC. As part of its integrated VMS system, MassHighway was able to post and change messages on its permanent set of message boards almost instantaneously. The video integration system allowed officials from different agencies to view real-time images from cameras mounted at multiple locations. SmarTraveler was able to post changes in roadway or transit conditions instantaneously on its website and phone system.

## **Conclusions**

Several themes emerged from this review. First, the importance of assessing the security of the transportation infrastructure during site selection cannot be overemphasized. This has both staff implications and timing considerations. Senior federal and state security officials should be part of the initial review process and as much time as possible to review feasible transportation options should be built into the planning process. The major agency players also need the time to learn each other’s requirements and resources; this knowledge can have positive short- and long-term impacts on interagency relationships.

Another important result of the DNC is that it provided the managers of multiple agencies a perfect venue to integrate their technology with other agencies and to build on that integration for future expansion of the ITS architecture for the Boston region. For large-scale events as well as for day-to-day operations, transportation agency officials should explore ways to provide as much information as possible, as quickly as possible, to allow the public to make informed choices. This should include the use of the media, agency websites displaying video, agency publications, public meetings, and other outside sources.

There should be a clear regional leader and a command structure that delineates the roles and responsibilities of each of the operations centers and how those operations centers will communicate with each other. The Boston region's transportation network is overseen by a myriad of local, regional, and state agencies. The planning process for the convention was complicated by the fact that there was no one clear leader for transportation issues.

After the convention was over, each of the agency personnel interviewed spoke about the difficulties and costs involved in planning for and managing the event. Each one of them also noted, however, that the magnitude of the planning effort forced them to work with different agencies, examine problems in new and diverse ways, and better understand the needs of their sister agencies. Representatives from several agencies noted the need to continue building upon the relationships that were established and the desire to continue joint agency planning exercises. This will enable them to be better prepared for both future planned and unplanned events, and to better manage the day-to-day operations of the system.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

**On November 13, 2002**, the Democratic Convention Nominating Committee selected Boston as the host city for its national convention to be held in **July 2004**. Although the announcement was made 14 months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, security and other issues related to protection from terrorism were not well understood. Consequently, event planners did not anticipate the controls that were later implemented to secure the area surrounding the DNC site. The need to close or restrict major portions of the transportation system did not become fully apparent to event and transportation planners until approximately a year after the Democratic National Convention Committee (DNCC) had committed to using the FleetCenter, which is located in downtown Boston adjacent to several transportation nodes.

**In June 2003**, the convention was declared a National Special Security Event (NSSE); accordingly, the U.S. Secret Service assumed responsibility for event security. Not until **late 2003** did a coordinated effort among security and transportation officials begin to fully explore the need for major transportation closings. **In March 2004**, a representative of the Massachusetts State Police announced preliminary plans for closures and restrictions to the media and the Boston metropolitan area.

This report is based on the review and evaluation conducted by staff at the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and is organized into eight sections. The following section describes the transportation infrastructure of the Boston metropolitan area. The third section discusses the planning that occurred before the convention. The fourth section presents the transportation plan implemented during the convention week. The fifth section reviews the impact that the DNC had on the Boston-area transportation system. The sixth section identifies activities that occurred after the convention concluded. The seventh section discusses findings and observations developed by the review team. Conclusions are presented in the eighth section.

## 2. OVERVIEW OF THE BOSTON AREA TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE


The Boston metropolitan area has an extensive transportation network serving the 3 million residents of eastern Massachusetts. Its transportation system offers several alternatives to commuters traveling to and from work as well as travelers moving between major cities.

### 2.1 Highways

The region's highways are generally laid out in a "hub and spoke" configuration. The Interstate Highways going through the city are I-93, which runs north and south and includes the Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Bridge (Zakim Bridge), the Central Artery, and the Southeast Expressway; and I-90 (the Massachusetts Turnpike), which runs east and west, and includes the Ted Williams Tunnel, which provides direct access to Logan International Airport. The main beltway around Boston is I-95/State Route (SR) 128. There are also five important non-interstate highways in the region:

- US Route 1, which includes the Tobin Memorial Bridge, is operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport)
- The US Route 1A corridor runs from downtown Boston to Logan International Airport. The corridor comprises Route 1A, which is operated by the Massachusetts Highway Department (MassHighway), and the Sumner and Callahan tunnels, which are operated by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MassPike). The airport roadway system is operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport).
- Storrow Drive and Memorial Drive are operated by the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR)
- Monsignors McGrath and O'Brien Highway, SR 28, are operated by the DCR

Traffic volumes on I-93, the highway that is adjacent to the DNC location, vary from 214,000 to 250,000 vehicles per day north of downtown Boston and from 190,000 to 212,000 vehicles per day south of the downtown area. Figure 1 illustrates the existing regional highway system.



**Figure 1. Regional highway system**

## 2.2 Public Transportation

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) operates the public transit system. It provides service to approximately 1.2 million riders a day through its 4 subway lines, Green, Orange, Red, and Blue; 13 commuter rail lines; 170 bus routes; 5 water ferry routes; and a paratransit program. Workers in downtown Boston are heavily dependent upon transit. In some of the denser parts of downtown Boston, more than 60 percent of workers commute by transit. Figure 2 shows the MBTA's rapid transit network serving Boston and its surrounding communities.



Figure 2. Map of MBTA Rapid Transit Lines

## **2.3 Intercity Rail**

Boston has two intercity railroad train terminal stations —North Station, located underneath the FleetCenter, and South Station — as well as one intermediate station, Back Bay Station.

Together the three stations served approximately 1.5 million Amtrak passengers in 2002. South Station was used by 1.06 million passengers while 218,000 used Back Bay Station. Downeaster provides Amtrak service from North Station to Portland, Maine. There were 220,000 passengers who used North Station for this service. South Station is the terminus of two Amtrak routes: the Northeast Corridor, which serves the corridor from Washington, D.C., to Boston, and the Lake Shore Limited, which serves the corridor from Boston to Chicago.

## **2.4 Passenger Air**

Logan International Airport, operated by Massport, is the 12th busiest airport in the country and handles approximately 27 million passengers annually. There are several smaller airports that also serve the region, including Hanscom Field, a civil and military airport that has some passenger and freight service. Hanscom Field is located 20 miles northwest of Boston.

## **2.5 Waterways**

Waterway traffic includes both ferry and freight service through Boston Harbor. The MBTA runs several ferry lines from Long Wharf, Rowes Wharf, Lovejoy Wharf, and Logan Airport, which connect to communities elsewhere in the harbor. Also large cruise ships dock at Black Falcon Pier in South Boston, and many smaller cruise boats operate within the harbor or up the Charles River. The Charles River dam, located near the FleetCenter, provides access for recreational boats between the Charles River and Boston Harbor.

Freight carriers include fuel tankers and container ships. Container ships dock at Conley Terminal in South Boston. Tankers, carrying oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), proceed through the harbor and under the Tobin Memorial Bridge to the Mystic River terminals in Chelsea and Everett.

### 3. PRE-EVENT PLANNING

The DNCC began the process of selecting a city for its 2004 convention in October 2001, one month after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. About a year later, the city of Boston was chosen to host the convention, and a contract was signed in December 2002. Recognizing the importance of transporting delegates and visitors during the convention week, the city of Boston had involved the MBTA early in its proposal process. MBTA managers signed the proposal and were active participants in the initial transportation planning. No other state transportation agencies were signatories to the proposal because it was not yet understood that they would be key players. Ultimately, a well-coordinated response to unanticipated security priorities would require a more comprehensive approach, with the integrated efforts of these agencies.

#### 3.1 Site Selection:

The location chosen for the convention was the FleetCenter in downtown Boston, a multipurpose sports facility that is home to two of the city's major sports teams, the Boston Celtics and Boston Bruins. From the standpoint of mobility, the FleetCenter was well sited to provide excellent transit and roadway access for the convention — the building houses one of Boston's two commuter rail terminal stations, North Station; two of the region's four subway lines, the Green Line and the Orange Line, run underneath the building; and the Center is adjacent to I-93, the Central Artery, and the Zakim Bridge.



**Figure 3 The FleetCenter with the Zakim Bridge behind it**

But from a security standpoint, as planners would later learn, the site presented a host of serious problems, many of which stemmed from its location near major highway, transit, and water transportation lines. The ultimate resolution would require closing portions of the transportation

infrastructure and imposing transportation access restrictions never before seen in Boston. Figure 3 shows the FleetCenter with the twin spires of the Zakim Bridge in the background.

### **3.2 Initial Planning Focuses on Mobility**

Transportation-related planning for the DNC began immediately after the site was selected, but at the time security was not the paramount issue. The traffic engineers and planners at the various transportation agencies were focused on providing mobility to accommodate the additional demand the convention would place on the existing transportation infrastructure. Of course, security was always a concern, but not a driving force.

On May 27, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials declared that the 2004 DNC would be a National Special Security Event (NSSE). This designation raised the security concerns to a primary role and gave federal security officials a greater voice in how and when mobility would be provided around the site.

A number of factors are taken into consideration when designating an event as a NSSE, including anticipated attendance by dignitaries, the size of the event, and the significance of the event. Since 1999, there have been 20 designated National Special Security Events. (Appendix H more fully describes the NSSE process and lists previously designated events.)

Developing a regional transportation plan for the DNC was complex—it involved multiple agencies, often with overlapping jurisdictions and priorities. Staff at many of these agencies were not accustomed to working closely with staff from other agencies in their day-to-day operations, nor were they in the habit of routinely sharing data and information. Working through these complexities was part of the long process whereby agencies learned to work together in a new security environment. That process took a lot of time and building of relationships. Ultimately, the representatives of the various transportation and security entities pulled together, putting aside their differing organizational habits and working collaboratively.

### **3.3 Security Concerns Alter the Plan**

By late 2003, the security officials, including representatives from the U.S. Secret Service, the Massachusetts State Police, and the Boston Police Department, reinforced the need for heightened security to the transportation agencies and the city of Boston officials. The U.S. Secret Service set a hard and fast deadline for the road closures during convention hours: by 7:00 p.m. each evening, I-93 adjacent to the FleetCenter was to be closed and free of all non-official vehicles. North Station would either be closed or access to trains would be severely restricted. It was up to the transportation agencies and state and local police to decide when to begin the closures to hit the deadline.

It was clear that the transportation operations plan for the DNC was not going to be a typical transportation management plan, driven by goals such as mobility and air quality. Rather, it was to be a response to a security plan, whose requirements, by design and necessity, were absolute. As Mr. William Bent, MassHighway State Traffic Engineer stated, “The DNC plan was, ‘this [road closure] is what’s going to happen, and you come up with the best solutions to it.’”

In order to lay the ground rules – the foundation – upon which the DNC transportation management plan could be developed, the U.S. Secret Service worked with the law enforcement community to develop several scenarios for closing I-93 during the convention. One plan included closing the highway full-time for the entire convention, a plan that would have shut Boston down for the week. Another option included keeping I-93 open but excluding trucks and cargo vans. The police would play the gatekeeper role by assessing the remaining vehicles and determining which ones could proceed. Ultimately, the U.S. Secret Service decided to go with a modified plan that closed I-93 during certain hours, beginning as early as 4:00 p.m. and lasting until approximately midnight. With this foundation established, the work on developing a traffic operations plan could begin in earnest.

Development of the operations plan was slow and painstaking, because there were numerous state, local, and regional agencies involved, and there was no single person with final authority over the plan. Mr. Bent noted that there was “no guru to say ‘this is it.’” Furthermore, they don’t teach you in traffic engineering class how to shut down interstates for a major event.”

When the State Police reviewed the initial transportation plan, they noted that it lacked provisions to ensure full-time, unobstructed access for emergency vehicles. According to Major Michael C. Mucci, the Massachusetts State Police officer in charge of all traffic operations for the DNC, law enforcement and emergency responders needed “access into and out of the city on every major highway.” The plan was modified, and dedicated emergency lanes were designated for I-93 North and South and I-90.

### **National Special Security Event**

When an event is designated a National Special Security Event by the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead federal agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan, and Federal resources are deployed to maintain the level of security needed for the event and the area. The goal of such an operation is to prevent terrorist attacks and criminal acts. Once an event is designated a National Special Security Event, five resources are put into place:

- Secret Service works with federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety officials to coordinate safety and security related activities.
- The Secret Service deploys physical infrastructure security fencing and barricades, special access accreditation badges, K-9 teams, and other security technologies.
- The Secret Service oversees planning, directing, and executing federal security operations.
- The Secret Service trains command-level law enforcement and public safety officials to provide fundamental principles for managing security of major events to reduce vulnerabilities related to terrorism and other criminal acts.
- DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response will place various specialized emergency preparedness and search and rescue teams at the event location.

The State Police also noted the need for a comprehensive evacuation plan for downtown Boston. Of paramount importance was a plan to avert gridlock in the event that a major emergency – such as a terrorist attack – caused a mass exodus from the downtown. In developing its plan, the State Police used a much more stringent definition of gridlock than is usual. Major Mucci stated: “Gridlock is not about arriving an hour late to work. Gridlock is sitting for one or two hours, going absolutely nowhere, because you are pinned in from all sides.” In such a scenario, evacuating the city is impossible, and emergency response vehicles cannot get where they need to go. The State Police evacuation plan included a sequential road-closure strategy. In the most extreme case, this could mean that travelers were diverted many miles outside of their normal routes. In addition to road closure protocols, the evacuation plan included provisions for converting certain inbound lanes on I-90 to outbound flow for increased capacity.

During the planning phase, representatives from the Massachusetts FHWA division office met with MassHighway officials to review the proposed plans, hours of operations, and the types of diversions. It was determined that no Federal Highway approvals were required for the closure of I-93 through downtown Boston because the closures were temporary in nature.

Security concerns also had a dramatic impact on transit-service planning for the event. Alan Castaline, MBTA Deputy Chief Operating Officer, noted “under the initial planning, the MBTA was approaching this event in a similar fashion to other past large scale events like the July 4<sup>th</sup> Esplanade concerts, the 2000 Tall Ships, or the 1999 Ryder Cup Golf Tournament. The objective there was to transport thousands of people with a smile. But this event was going to be very different—security would force the MBTA to alter its thinking on how to provide service during a large-scale event.”

### **3.4 Traffic Models Present a Challenging Goal**

By March 2004, it was clear to highway officials that security considerations would require the closing of major facilities. Although Boston hosts several regular large-scale events noteworthy for their impact on the transportation system—such as Sail Boston, the Boston Marathon, and its annual New Year’s Eve and July 4th celebrations—none of those events ever required closing the highway system or shutting a major commuter rail terminal as part of the plan. Quite the contrary, those events always maximized full use of the public transit system. Consequently, officials recognized that traffic modeling—always an important tool in transportation planning—would be critical for predicting how drivers in and around Boston would respond to the DNC road closures. The Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS), which is the planning staff for the Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization, was commissioned to perform a series of model runs to simulate the roadway restrictions.

The network modeling software that planners routinely use to predict traffic impacts from capital improvements was not ideally suited for modeling DNC-related impacts, because the DNC closings and restrictions brought a high degree of uncertainty into the system. As Karl Quackenbush, Deputy Technical Director of CTPS, stated, “The models assume full knowledge of the path you [a driver] take and the paths you don’t take. That is not necessarily the case if you are forcing people to take diversions. The models are used for capital investments. With this kind of event [the DNC], there is a lack of perfect knowledge. The Winnebago driver from out

of state who is lost [because of a road closure] is a problem that the model can not take into account.”

Compounding the uncertainty with respect to driver behavior was the uncertainty about the numbers of drivers who would avoid the downtown area during the DNC. The planners knew that some percentage of drivers would have the option to suspend their normal downtown commutes during the DNC—by taking vacation or telecommuting, for example—but the planners had no way of predicting exactly what that number would be. To work around this lack of information, planners modeled scenarios with traffic volumes ranging from a “best case” of less than half of normal to 75 percent of normal flow.

Despite its limitations, the traffic modeling did provide useful information to transportation and security officials. Early on in the planning process, the models indicated quite clearly that traffic volumes would need to be reduced to half of normal, or less, to avoid serious disruptions. Policy makers were faced with the challenge of reducing afternoon commuting by at least 50 percent of normal volume.

## 4. OPERATIONS PLAN

Once the need to close I-93 and North Station became clear and the initial model results gave preliminary trends, transportation experts set about determining how to impose restrictions on the system, but still allow mobility for the 3 million residents in the Boston region. As previously noted, the overall goal was to reduce vehicle travel by 50 percent during the p.m. peak period to ensure that massive gridlock would not occur. The operations plan also had to ensure that, should a major emergency happen when the roads were open but operating with restricted lanes, emergency vehicles could get in and out of Boston quickly.

### 4.1 Building Flexibility into the Plan

Transportation officials and security officials developed a plan that emphasized flexibility while ensuring that the highway around the FleetCenter was closed to unauthorized traffic by 7:00 p.m. Although the majority of restrictions were centered around the FleetCenter, the impact of the closures extended much farther; the plan designated 40 miles of roadway to be closed or restricted during the p.m. peak period, with restrictions extending approximately 10 miles north, south, and west of downtown Boston. This was in large part intentional. Transportation planners wanted to locate the closure or detour points at places that diverted traffic onto roads that were familiar to most drivers, and that had sufficient capacity to handle the additional traffic. This required pushing the diversion points farther out than originally envisioned. With North Station, located in the FleetCenter, closed during the entire convention, commuter rail operations north of the city were diverted to intermediate stations where substitute bus service would carry commuter rail passengers into the city.

This plan required that as early as 4:00 p.m., all resources would be in place to divert traffic and close down portions of the system leading up to the FleetCenter. The actual decision of when to close the various components, however, was left up to the State Police officer in charge of the event, Major Mucci. Because real-time data was used to determine closure times, disruption to travelers was minimized. This ability to remain flexible but take action when needed was key to the plan's success.

Special 24-hour inbound lanes were designated for use by emergency vehicles; MBTA won approval from the Massachusetts State Police to have its substitute bus service use the I-93 emergency vehicle lanes at all times.



**Figure 4. Quick Kurb on I-93**

Traffic control devices were key to supporting these restrictions, and the plan called for new devices, as well as new uses for existing infrastructure. To provide an emergency lane in the southbound lanes of I-93 north of Boston, MassHighway contractors installed six miles of Quick Kurb. As shown in Figure 4, Quick Kurb is a flexible, lane-divider system that can be installed to provide short-term or permanent lane demarcations. A prominent example of how officials employed existing infrastructure was the use of HOV lanes on I-93, both north and south of the city, as dedicated lanes for emergency vehicles and designated buses

Having developed their operations plan, the next challenge for the staffs of the transportation agencies was ensuring that they had the necessary resources, including personnel, equipment, and new purchases or temporary rentals to complete this ambitious undertaking.

- **Personnel.** Agency managers worked with their personnel to ensure adequate staffing leading up to and during the event. This negotiation often meant dealing with union rules governing work hours and conditions. Because everyone, management and staff included, recognized the importance of the tasks at hand, the process for the most part was extremely cooperative. In one instance, a union allowed for a variation on seniority rules to allow the agency managers to call in workers who lived nearest the facility first in case of extreme traffic conditions.
- **Equipment.** MassHighway Commissioner John Cogliano stressed the need for each agency to inventory its existing equipment not only to ensure adequate resources, but also to be able to track its equipment during the event. The agency wanted to ensure that no official vehicles were stolen and used to breach any of the security zones.
- **Purchases and rentals.** Streamlining the contracting process was also a key concern since there were less than six months from the development of the plans to the event. As one example, in the case of the portable variable message signs (VMS) and static signs that needed to be ordered and installed, the Commissioner and his staff convened the MassHighway Board of Commissioners and was able to go from bid opening to notice to proceed in two days, thereby ensuring that the signs were obtained and deployed in time for the event.

Interagency coordination was a key component of the operations plan. During the convention week, in addition to those discussed in subsection 4.8, Transportation Operations Centers, regular coordinating activities took place:

- To ensure that all authorized personnel had access to the same information, in the morning and in the afternoon a conference call was held to go over any outstanding issues. A representative for the National Weather Service would give a weather update, and then a spokesperson from each of the major agencies would report on any major issues.
- During the convention week, the emergency coordinator in the Massachusetts FHWA division office stayed in contact with the Massachusetts State Police at their Operations Control Center and received an update briefing every morning. This information was then relayed to the emergency coordinator in FHWA headquarters in Washington, D.C. She, in turn, would forward the information to FHWA management who were responsible for the FHWA national security activities at headquarters.


## 4.2 Highways

Although the U.S. Secret Service had imposed an absolute requirement that I-93 adjacent to the FleetCenter be totally free of all unauthorized vehicles by 7:00 p.m., the state and city officials designed their traffic response plan to maximize their flexibility in shutting down sections of the highway and diverting traffic to minimize disruption to travelers. Recognizing that the time required to empty the highway of traffic was dependent upon traffic speeds and volumes, the officials adopted a “fluid” road closure plan. Traffic volumes and speeds on various road segments were carefully monitored to determine how quickly the highway would empty of traffic, and the closure times were adjusted accordingly. In addition to camera feeds and traffic reports, the MassTurnpike utilized six vehicles to perform travel time runs on various highways in the hours before the closure. All of that information was then relayed to the State Police commander at the Highway Operations Center who would issue the orders for the closures. Because of this flexibility, the police were able to wait until as late as possible to begin closing highways.

Beginning around 4:00 p.m. I-93 North and South would be closed to traffic heading into Boston during the convention week. These restrictions lasted until approximately 12 midnight. Several feeder roads were closed or restricted, such as the Callahan and Sumner tunnels, I-90 to the Allston-Brighton tolls, and US 1 from the Zakim Bridge to SR 60. The inbound lanes to important secondary roads around the FleetCenter, including Causeway Street, Storrow Drive, Memorial Drive, and the Monsignors McGrath and O’Brien Highways, were similarly closed. Figure 5 details the roadway restrictions within the Boston area.

In addition to the closures, special emergency vehicle and bus-only inbound lanes were set up on both the existing I-93 HOV lanes and temporary lanes created on I-93 and I-90 inside of I-95. South of Boston, the “Zipper” lane—a previously installed HOV lane created with movable concrete barriers and which can be deployed in either direction was fixed in the northbound lanes. North of Boston on I-93, a combination of the permanent HOV and six miles of Quick Kurb barriers were used. These special lanes on I-93 were in place from Friday, July 23, to Friday, July 30, 2004 and were restricted to authorized users during that time.

Other significant changes were made to accommodate the anticipated crowds on other highways and on public transportation. I-90, including the Ted Williams Tunnel to the airport, was expected to bear the majority of rerouted traffic within Boston. Drivers were also encouraged to take I-95 around the city instead of trying to drive the city on I-93.



**Figure 5: Roadway closings in Boston area**

### 4.3 Public Transportation

From Friday, July 23, at 8:00 p.m. to the afternoon on Friday, July 31, 2004, North Station was closed. Thus, the five commuter rail trains that ended at North Station stopped at stations farther out, where buses or subway trains could take passengers into downtown Boston. During that same period, Orange Line subway trains and Green Line trolleys did not stop at North Station. Additionally, since the Orange Line trains ran under to the FleetCenter, baggage searches were conducted on each train at the station preceding North Station. During the convention hours, the entire MBTA subway system was running at peak hour scheduling.

Bus routes that traveled to North Station were either rerouted or canceled for that week. Haymarket Station, a bus and subway station just a few minutes walk from North Station, was closed to buses after 3:00 p.m. Buses after this time were rerouted to South Station. Alan Castaline, MBTA's Deputy Chief Operating Officer, noted that "the MBTA asked the private bus carriers to informally poll its regular commuters on what they intended to do during the convention week. It provided nice feedback because the surveys showed that ridership would be significantly lower during the week." Figure 6 shows the transit and waterway restrictions that would be put in place for the convention. Figure 7 is a map of the MBTA commuter rail lines that serve North Station (the solid circle at the bottom of the map) and the stations at which they terminated during the convention. The dotted purple lines show express bus routes run during the week to bring rail commuters into the city.



Figure 6. Summary of transit and waterway restrictions during the DNC

#### 4.4 Intercity Rail

Amtrak provides service to both South Station and North Station. Service out of South Station, which includes the Acela Express along the Northeast Corridor and the Lake Shore Limited to Chicago, was unaffected by the event. The Downeaster, which provides service from Portland, Maine to North Station, was suspended for the duration of the convention.



Figure 7. MBTA commuter rail routes from North Station

#### 4.5 Passenger Air

To protect the airspace around the event, the Federal Aviation Administration imposed severe restrictions on flight travel through the Boston area. Starting Monday, July 26, and ending Friday, July 30, 2004, all noncommercial flights were banned within 10 miles of the FleetCenter, which is located approximately two miles from Logan International Airport. A 30-nautical-mile ban was enforced on all private aircraft. This restriction meant that helicopters flown for news agencies were grounded during the event, restricting their ability to provide live video coverage of any potential traffic problems.

## 4.6 Waterways

Because the FleetCenter is located adjacent to the harbor, restrictions were imposed on several types of waterway traffic. All commuter ferry service to Lovejoy Wharf was suspended for the duration of the event. In addition, all deliveries of liquid natural gas (LNG) through Boston Harbor were suspended for the week. The Coast Guard increased patrols throughout the harbor for the duration of the event.

## 4.7 Physical Security Measures

Numerous types of physical barriers were used to block off roads and ramps, including vehicles, cones, barrels, and barriers. At strategic points where a more substantial barrier was required—such as roads leading to the FleetCenter—loaded sand trucks were parked across the lane to block access (Figure 8).

Even with the major roadways around the FleetCenter closed off during convention hours, security personnel remained vigilant. One example of this vigilance was the State Police’s protocol for inspecting ambulances. During convention hours, the State Police communications center was informed of all ambulance dispatches coming into secure areas, including information about the drivers and passengers. At four checkpoints, State Police troopers momentarily stopped and inspected all official vehicles, including ambulances, to make certain that the occupants fit the official descriptions.



**Figure 8. Sand truck blocking street near FleetCenter**

## 4.8 Transportation Operations Centers

Staffs at MassHighway, the MassTurnpike, the MBTA, the city of Boston, and the State Police all operated transportation operations centers (TOCs) during the DNC week to monitor traffic. In addition, other state and federal agencies used numerous other operations centers to monitor other aspects of the event. Centers included the U.S. Secret Service’s Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC), which was the federal government’s command center, and Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency’s (MEMA) State Emergency Operations Center. Each federal and state center was in communication with the others, and many centers were staffed by representatives of other agencies.

MEMA staff coordinated the DNC State Working Group, which was established in January 2004 and comprised representatives from numerous state agencies, including the Executive Office of Public Safety, Executive Office of Transportation, Governor’s Office, Massachusetts State Police, Department of Fire Services, MEMA, Department of Public Health, Massachusetts

National Guard, and the MBTA. The DNC Working Group had been meeting regularly in the months preceding the DNC and was responsible for four activities:

- Assuring that core services could be delivered throughout the Commonwealth during the DNC
- Providing or coordinating state resources as needed to the city of Boston and the federal agencies overseeing the DNC
- Tracking costs to the Commonwealth resulting from increased demand for services during the DNC
- Developing an integrated response and emergency management supplement plan for the DNC.

Officials in several towns established emergency operations centers specifically for the DNC. Staffs at these centers handled all activities within their jurisdictions, which included transportation. A state police liaison was usually assigned to an EOC to ensure that the municipal staffs were informed of road closures.

## **4.9 Highway Signing**

During the DNC week, MassHighway and MassPike used permanent and portable variable message signs (VMS) and temporary, static highway signs to keep travelers informed about road closures and other DNC-related traffic information. In addition to the 75 portable and 15 permanent VMS already in its system, MassHighway rented an additional 25 portable VMS that could be controlled remotely from the MassHighway TOC. The system enabled an operator at the TOC to select a particular VMS and choose an action (e.g., close two lanes). The software would display a set of messages for that VMS to display, at which point the operator could approve the messages as written, or edit them before sending them to the VMS.

## **4.10 Video System**

An event the size and complexity of the DNC presents transportation management and security challenges that require a system-wide perspective. Throughout the Boston metropolitan area there are several hundred video cameras in place. Prior to the DNC however, there was no interagency sharing of video data. Each agency maintained an independent video system.

The development and implementation of the Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System (MIVIS) was a goal that staff at various agencies had been working toward for several years, but most estimates put initial implementation at least two to three years in the future. Insufficient funding was the primary reason for the long implementation time. Also, in the absence of an immediate need for seamless, system-wide video coverage, most agencies concentrated on their individual operations rather than interagency cooperation. The DNC changed all that.

The DNC supplied the impetus to accelerate MIVIS development and implementation. It also provided additional funding for the system through the Department of Homeland Security. By pooling funds from DHS, MassHighway, and the city of Boston, MIVIS participants were able to install the hardware (e.g., video switching equipment), software, and other infrastructure (e.g., additional fiber-optic cable and microwave towers) necessary to make the MIVIS operational.

Also, a memorandum of understanding among the participants enabled sharing of video data. At the time of the DNC, MIVIS participants included MassHighway, the city of Boston, the MBTA, the Massachusetts State Police, and SmarTraveler, the area's provider of traveler information. Cameras operated by the MassPike were included in the MIVIS through the MassPike feed to the city of Boston.

The MIVIS has the capacity to support 1,000 video cameras. Live images from all cameras are available at three traffic management centers, on desktop computers, and via personal digital assistants (PDAs) that were purchased specifically for the DNC and distributed to transportation staff and law enforcement personnel. A user selects which camera image he wants to view, and the system provides it. Connection speed and bandwidth determine whether a user can access still images or full-motion video. During the DNC, the PDAs— thirty in all— proved extremely useful. With a PDA, a police officer on the ground could get a bird's eye view of his area from cameras on helicopters and rooftops, enabling him to determine whether an incident (e.g., a traffic jam) was localized or widespread.

MIVIS was also used to enhance the regional motorist assistance patrol, CaresVans, which is operated by private vendors and funded by a local insurance company. A total of 30 CaresVans connected to a global positioning system (GPS) normally operate on the region's Interstate highways and respond to accidents or motorist problems, such as vehicles that have run out of gasoline. During the DNC, the CaresVans were operated for extended hours. If a MIVIS camera revealed an incident needing response (e.g., a disabled vehicle or a medical emergency), response staff using the GPS technology could identify the nearest CaresVan and direct it to the exact location of the incident, thereby ensuring a faster response.

#### 4.11 Traveler Information

SmarTraveler began operation in the Boston region in 1993. It provides real-time traffic information within the region and uses aircraft, mobile units, cameras, scanners, and interagency communications to gather information. Travelers can access traffic reports by telephone via interactive voice response (IVR) technology and on the Internet from the SmarTraveler website and numerous other sites that contract with SmarTraveler.

In the weeks leading up to the DNC, SmarTraveler's information outlets experienced steadily increasing use. SmarTraveler daily call volumes peaked on Monday, July 26, 2004, the first day of the DNC. SmarTraveler website activity also increased dramatically in July. Section 7.4.2 in the Findings section, "Using Technology to Communicate," provides details on SmarTraveler use preceding and during the DNC. Appendix E provides more information about SmarTraveler.



**Figure 9. VMS advertising cell phone number for SmarTraveler**

## 5. EFFECT ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Before the convention, local and state transportation and law enforcement officials were extremely worried about the potential for gridlock during the hours of the convention. The threat of some type of terrorist attack or disruption by protestors also presented concerns. However, because of the extensive public awareness campaign on the part of the DNC, the city of Boston, and state officials, enough residents of the Boston region shifted their commuting and travel patterns so that there were no major transportation problems during the week of the convention. Because of the lack of major problems, the daily interagency conference calls which were scheduled to address any outstanding issues among the agencies typically took less than 15 minutes.

### 5.1 Impact on Traffic Volumes

The public communications efforts that transportation officials made in the weeks prior to the DNC paid off. MassHighway traffic data show that total traffic volumes declined significantly during the DNC week (Figure 10). Moreover, those commuters who did drive into Boston during the DNC week changed their travel patterns: they came to work and went home much earlier than usual to avoid the anticipated traffic jams as I-93 closures took effect. During the DNC week, early-morning (4:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m.) traffic volumes were considerably higher than normal – in some cases early-morning traffic increased by more than 70 percent – while afternoon volumes were greatly reduced, again by more than 70 percent in some cases.




Figure 10. Changes in Traffic Volume

Traffic along the affected routes adjacent to the FleetCenter was at less than 10 percent of normal volume in the hour before the closure. The State Police officers had estimated that on a normal

traffic night it would take 1.5 hours to close the highway sections. Because of the lack of traffic during the p.m. rush hour during the DNC week, the State Police were able to close off access to a four-mile stretch of I-93 north and south of the FleetCenter within 8 minutes. It took 5 minutes to close the relevant portions of the I-93/SR 60 interchange in Medford. The closures were accomplished by a combination of police and transportation employees utilizing police cruisers, sand trucks, wooden and jersey barriers, and traffic cones.

Because of the potential added threat posed by a truck, the State Police were stopping and inspecting as many large commercial trucks as they could at the outskirts of town. Four truck inspection teams inspected approximately 10,000 trucks during the convention week. Notice of these inspections and messages advising truckers to avoid traveling through the city and to use the two circumferential interstates (I-95 and I-495) resulted in a reduction of truck traffic on the I-93 corridor.

The emergency lanes that had been established on I-93 North and South and the MassTurnpike were used during the convention week by MBTA express commuter buses and DNC buses for delegates as well as state and local law enforcement vehicles. There was no need during the week to utilize them for any type of emergency operations. Even though these lanes reduced the number of lanes available to drivers, no significant congestion occurred.

## **5.2 Impact on Transit Ridership**

The DNC had only a moderate effect on ridership levels of most transit modes. It did, however, have a significant effect on ridership patterns: transit riders on all modes shifted their commuting times and traveled into and out of Boston earlier than usual. In many cases, employers changed work hours for the week of the DNC and allowed employees to work at other offices or to telecommute. In addition, many commuters shifted their schedules to allow extra travel time. Table 1 shows ridership levels for the first and last days of the DNC. A full version of the table, with ridership levels for all days of the convention is in Appendix H.

Morning peak-period subway ridership levels were lowest on the first day of the convention, at 88 percent of normal. By the convention's conclusion on Thursday, ridership had returned to 95 percent of normal. Subway ridership levels ranged from 91 to 98 percent during the early afternoon peaks and from 66 to 75 percent during the late afternoon peaks<sup>1</sup>. On some subway lines, midday ridership levels were up significantly, most likely as the result of convention delegates using the transit system for sightseeing. Local bus ridership levels ranged from 83 to 99 percent of normal during the morning peaks, from 67 to 100 percent during the early afternoon peaks, and from 72 to 81 percent during the late afternoon peaks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Morning peak period: 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. early afternoon peak: 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.; late afternoon peak: 5:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

**Table 1. Daily Ridership for MBTA During Week of the DNC**

	Baseline Ridership	Monday, July 26		Thursday, July 29	
		Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership	Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership
<b>Subway</b>					
AM Peak Inbound	73,750	64,900	88%	67,500	95%
Early PM Peak Outbound	44,675	41,100	92%	40,700	91%
Late PM Peak Outbound	55,000	36,300	66%	38,400	70%
<b>Express Bus</b>					
AM Peak Inbound	2,990	3,526	118%	2,980	99%
Early PM Peak Outbound	1,100	1,317	120%	1,216	111%
Late PM Peak Outbound	1,800	1,334	74%	1,430	79%
<b>Local Bus</b>					
AM Peak Inbound	30,650	30,035	98%	25,448	83%
Early PM Peak Outbound	21,000	21,000	100%	18,357	87%
Late PM Peak Outbound	25,930	19,969	77%	18,451	72%
<b>Commuter Rail North</b>					
AM Peak Inbound	16,060	5,300	33%	4,441	27%
Early PM Peak Outbound	2,195	1,800	82%	1,252	57%
Late PM Peak Outbound	11,600	2,900	25%	1,739	15%
<b>Commuter Rail South</b>					
AM Peak Inbound	37,950	33,400	88%	26,754	70%
Early PM Peak Outbound	5,475	5,200	95%	5,998	109%
Late PM Peak Outbound	22,690	17,700	78%	14,320	63%

Commuter rail patrons traveling to Boston from the north experienced limited access and no direct service to North Station. Many northside commuter rail patrons shifted from the commuter rail service and onto express buses at stations north of Boston. Consequently, express bus ridership increased during DNC week. Morning peak-period ridership levels were 118 percent of baseline on the first day of the DNC, but had returned to normal levels by the final DNC day. Northside commuter rail ridership levels were significantly below normal during DNC week. Morning peak period ridership levels for northside commuter rail ranged from 27 to 51 percent of normal and late afternoon peaks ranged from 15 to 22 percent.

On commuter rail lines arriving at South Station from communities south of Boston, morning inbound ridership levels were below normal for the duration of the convention, ranging from 70 to 88 percent of baseline. Early afternoon peak levels were at or above normal range from 95 to 114 percent, and late afternoon peak levels ranged from 63 to 93 percent.

During the month before the convention, the MBTA instituted a policy of random checking of packages and bags on subway and commuter trains. Random searches were conducted during the DNC week but were suspended after the event was over.

### **5.3 Impact on Waterborne Ridership**

The U. S. Coast Guard closed the Charles River locks, limiting access between Boston Harbor and the Charles River during the convention. This did not affect commuters, but did restrict travel by recreational boaters and tour boat operators. The Coast Guard also conducted random searches of boats, boarded large freighters entering the harbor, and stopped all tankers carrying liquid natural gas deliveries for the week.

### **5.4 Impact on Air Travel**

Logan International Airport experienced heavier demand the days before and the day after the convention, but there were no large-scale delays of flights in or out of the airport. The FAA restrictions on noncommercial flights meant that media helicopters were grounded during the event. The Massachusetts State Police monitored traffic and crowd conditions with its fleet of helicopters and aircraft.

## 6. AFTERMATH

After the culmination of the DNC on Thursday, July 29, 2004, the transportation system in the Boston region quickly returned to normal. On Friday, July 30, 2004, the day after the convention, traffic conditions were slightly less than normal because of the number of people who had chosen to take the week off. Several actions occurred that day:

- All traffic restrictions were lifted, and all highways were re-opened. By the next Monday, traffic volumes had returned to normal summertime levels.
- All transit services returned to normal schedules and routes, and normal ridership patterns quickly ensued.
- The U.S. Secret Service and MEMA deactivated their operations centers. Federal security personnel who had been assigned to Boston for the DNC returned to their normal locations.
- Staffs at the MBTA, MassHighway, Massport, and the MassPike resumed their normal hours and duties.
- The Charles River Dam re-opened, restoring full access to Boston Harbor from the Charles River

In order to learn from the experience, MEMA staff convened a group of representatives of the DNC State Working Group for a debriefing on August 18, 2004. The Working Group provided information and suggestions regarding numerous areas, including planning and operations, the use of technology, documentation (e.g., written plans), command and control, and inter-agency coordination.

Although the MIVIS was deployed for the DNC, it is now a permanent resource for the participating agencies in Eastern Massachusetts. The MIVIS will continue to be available to transportation and security agencies, and work is underway to expand the system. Since the culmination of the DNC, managers at Massport and the MassPike have expressed interest in joining the next phase of MIVIS.

## 7. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

This review produced a number of findings and observations that may benefit transportation officials across the country as they plan for major large-scale events in their region. The findings have been grouped into five categories:

- **Security**
  - For any large-scale event, security must be considered during the site selection process.
  - For a National Special Security Event (NSSE), security needs drive the planning process.
  - The role of transportation in an NSSE has changed. Security officials request outcomes; transportation officials are tasked with implementation to achieve those outcomes.
- **Relationships**
  - It takes time to build trust among representatives of multiple agencies, so it is important to begin the planning process as early as possible.
  - Transportation engineers and security officials speak different languages.
  - There should be a clear regional leader in charge of all plan components to ensure the smooth operation of the transportation system.
- **Operations**
  - A special event can focus agencies to accomplish missions that may take longer in normal circumstances.
  - A special event can produce long-term benefits for day-to-day transportation operations.
  - An agency can use a forced closure to its advantage.
- **Communications**
  - All other preparations for a special event are meaningless if the traveling public is not well informed ahead of time about what to expect, and what their choices are.
  - Numerous types of technology should be used to communicate to the public before and during the event.
- **Technology**
  - Operations centers provide bases for officials to better manage event-specific operations and response activities.
  - Technology allows officials to monitor situations and broadcast information in real time, enabling better decision-making.

### 7.1 Security

For major planned events, in particular NSSEs, security is an increasingly important element of site selection and planning, often taking precedence over mobility. Transportation officials and planners will be expected to adapt to a “top-down” process.

### **7.1.1 Site selection**

**Security must be considered during the site selection process for any large-scale event; in particular for a National Special Security Event (NSSE), when security considerations dictate event planning.**

Although the selection process to determine the site and location of the DNC took place after September 11, 2001, the full implications of selecting a site that also serves as a major transit hub and is adjacent to the busiest section of highway in the Boston region were not considered. Doug Foy, Director of Commonwealth Development for Massachusetts, noted, “site selection has to contemplate the security implications from the very beginning of the process. The transportation implications of locating the DNC at the FleetCenter were enormous.” Initial event planners focused on traffic and transit implications and made mobility the primary consideration. But for this event, the security ramifications became the crucial determinant.

Accordingly, input from appropriate federal, state, and local safety and security officials is crucial. Major Michael Mucci of the Massachusetts State Police highlighted that during the selection process one or more public safety official with sufficient rank and authority to make decisions must be actively involved in the planning from the beginning. The need for security to outrank mobility is a crucial lesson for NSSE planners of the future. Site selection with input from all of the involved parties is a key component to success.

### **7.1.2 Role of Transportation**

**The role of transportation in major event planning and operations has changed: security officials request outcomes; transportation officials are tasked with implementation to achieve those outcomes.**

The heightened security requirements of the post-September 11 world have changed the way transportation planning is conducted for major events. Security needs are driving the planning process now, and many of the security-related goals require transportation officials and planners to do things they have never done before. Moreover, the process is decidedly top-down: security officials define the desired outcomes, and transportation officials and planners must figure out how to achieve them. For the 2004 DNC, the security officials requested certain outcomes and the transportation officials were charged with developing a management and operations plan to accomplish those outcomes. This give-and-take interaction between security and transportation staffs played out over the course of 18 months.

## **7.2 Relationships**

Effective relationships among local, state, and national staffs and among security and transportation officials are key to developing and implementing a successful transportation operations plan for a major event. Forming relationships that are based on mutual trust and understanding among disparate groups takes considerable time and effort.

### **7.2.1 Building Trust**

**It takes time to build trust among representatives of multiple agencies, so it is important to begin the planning process as early as possible.**

All interviewees from the federal, state, and local municipal agencies contacted during this review stressed the importance of early planning, consistent and appropriate agency participation in that planning, and regularly scheduled meetings. Many of the federal players had not worked with state or local officials; even municipal officials were often strangers to each other, and in the past, had occasionally been adversaries. Building trust among such disparate players takes time. So does the recognition of partnering opportunities – a full inventory of all available resources should happen early.

**Conflicting missions.** The interplay between security and mobility also takes considerable time to sort out. The mission of transportation agencies is multifaceted and includes enhancing and increasing mobility, aiding productivity, promoting safety, and ensuring security. The federal security agency officials are interested in security, first and foremost. To work out a trusting and cooperative relationship among agencies with clashing core missions takes time. As MassHighway Commissioner John Cogliano recognized, “You had all these varying groups. They had to coordinate a response plan and initially not everyone was on the same page. City officials wanted to make sure the city was open and did not hamper commerce. But then they saw how there are impacts – it was a learning process. From sharing the information they were able to come to agreement.”

At the local level, the relationship between the city of Boston and the MBTA also presented challenges. Initially, the city officials did not fully appreciate how valuable a resource the MBTA could actually be. Their natural focus was on the roadway, city streets, and vehicular access through and around the city. As John Martino of the MBTA Police pointed out, “the feeling was the event belonged to the city and they were capable of planning it and telling the T [MBTA] what to do. It did not identify security issues that the T had, and it did not identify anything that the T could do to help. When the Boston Police Department thinks about things, they only think above the ground. There is a need to sit down and look at it jointly. They don’t fully realize what an asset the T is...”

**Coordinated effort began late, but produced a viable plan.** While representatives of various city and state transportation agencies were involved in the bid proposal and preliminary work on planning for the convention in 2002, it was not until late 2003 that a coordinated effort among security and transportation officials began to fully explore the need for major adjustments to the transportation system. In order to ensure coordination, Boston Mayor Menino asked Jane Garvey, who has managed large federal and state transportation agencies, to convene a weekly meeting of staff from transportation and security agencies. This included representatives at the federal, state, and local levels. Meeting attendees were those officials directly responsible for the operations activities that would take place during the convention. Federal, state, and local agency representatives worked together during early 2004 to develop a viable plan. In March 2004, a press conference was held where a representative of the State Police announced preliminary plans for closures and restrictions to the media and the Boston metropolitan area.

Once all the transportation and security parties were assembled and meeting regularly, the communication process could begin. As the MassPike’s Charles Sterling put it, “If you have multiple agencies involved you have to be able to negotiate with each other, and you have to be able to stick with it – you cannot make unilateral changes. Otherwise no one will trust you in the

future. It takes time, lots of time, coupled with patience and a mutual commitment to achieve that level of cooperation in a major metropolitan area. The planning can't start too early.”

**Adjacent communities worked together to manage impacts.** While representatives of the city of Boston, the state transportation agencies, and the MBTA worked through their planning and coordination, the cities and towns adjacent to Boston were also working to manage the impact of the DNC on their communities and roadways. As the staff from the city of Quincy characterized its own process of the development and building of trusting relationships, “Representatives from the cities developed a strong working relationship. During the preparation, (Quincy) city staff participated in tabletop exercises. The participants developed a “good mindset” and put an appropriate structure in place. They also viewed this preparation as more than a one-time event. They expected to continue to work together after the convention.”

### 7.2.2 Conflicting Disciplines

**Transportation engineers and security officials speak different languages. It is important to have consistent and ongoing communications to ensure that each side understands the other.**

There are strong ideological difference between traffic engineers and security officials. Traffic engineers are concerned with the efficiency of the highway system and overall mobility – they focus on operations and the actions needed to keep things moving. Security officials are concerned with access control – their actions tend to make things stop. One simple example from pre-convention planning is an instance where the security officials identified a small section of highway that they wanted closed, but the ripple effect from the closure was going to result in 40 miles of closures.

MassPike’s Charles Sterling said, “The security dictated parameters – this has to be done by a certain time. The engineers developed how it will occur. This end state has to occur at such and such time. Most engineers are flexible if you come up with a solution that is cheaper or quicker. When you are dealing with security people – they are more rigid because of the need to take into account numerous safety and security scenarios.”

After many protracted meetings and input from model scenario results, the security officials and the operations officials began to understand each other’s requirements. The security officials tried to be as flexible as they could, for they were often confronted with massive traffic backups during incident responses.

### 7.2.3 Unified command

**Many local, state, and federal agencies are involved in major planned events. A clearly designated regional leader and unified support structure would help ensure comprehensive planning and smooth operations. This would be particularly important for response to unexpected incidents.**

**No clear regional leader.** For the DNC, there was no clear regional leader in charge of all components to ensure the smooth operation of the transportation system. The Mayor of Boston was clearly the leader for the city and its responsibilities. But most of the duties required to

ensure the secure management and operation of the transportation system during the DNC fell to agencies outside of the city's domain. These included federal security agencies, the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Capitol Police; numerous state agencies, Massachusetts State Police, MassHighway, MBTA, DCR, MEMA; and public authorities, MassPike and Massport. In addition, there are more than 100 other municipalities within the boundaries of the Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization that were affected. On the political level, historically a delicate dynamic exists between the Mayor of Boston and the Governor of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the need to find a common ground to ensure the successful planning and operation of the DNC was imperative.

**Weekly meetings provided a forum for all agencies.** Numerous interviewees noted early on the lack of a clearly identified leader who was responsible for all phases of the planning. To help fill this vacuum of leadership, the Mayor turned to a former state and federal transportation official who had a wide range of contacts and the respect of all of the parties, former Federal Aviation Administrator Jane Garvey. In order to ensure cooperation and understanding among the agencies, an informal working group composed of representatives of all transportation and safety and security agencies met every week for over a year. This group enabled the agencies to quickly respond to any outstanding issues.

**No unified command structure.** Apart from having a designated leader, it is crucial for a region to have a unified command structure in place to respond to unexpected events. In March 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It is a standardized management approach under which federal, state, and local governments must use to prepare for and respond to a major incident. The Incident Command System (ICS), part of the NIMS, is a structure by which multiple jurisdictions coordinate their response to a major event. It specifies five functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. (See Appendix G for a more detailed explanation of ICS and Unified Command.)

When the Secret Service assumes responsibility for a NSSE, Secret Service agents work with representatives of other federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions. They develop a plan that includes approximately 17 work groups in areas such as transportation, credentialing, and consequence management; representatives from appropriate agencies are requested to participate in these groups. The plan does not necessarily follow the ICS and Unified Command structures.

After the DNC was over, a working group comprising representatives of the state agencies most involved with the DNC conducted a debriefing. The participants observed that strict incident management system and unified command concepts were not exclusively used. They also said that many entities established command posts and, if a major incident did occur, no one was sure which command post would have been in charge. This group went on to recommend that the Incident Command System and Unified Command must be used to minimize confusion of command and control by all agencies.

### **7.3 Operations**

The efforts required to coordinate among agencies and operate the transportation system during a major event can result in benefits for day-to-day management and operations activities.

### **7.3.1 Accelerated Completions**

**A special event can focus agencies to accomplish missions that may take longer under normal circumstances.**

The unique security and mobility demands of the DNC, along with the hard-and-fast July 29, 2004 deadline, forced transportation agencies to be innovative. This innovation took many forms, including the cooperation of numerous agencies to accelerate the deployment of new ITS and to integrate previously unconnected systems. A prime example is the early deployment of the Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System (MIVIS). Prior to the DNC, MIVIS deployment was several years away. The DNC's transportation and security imperatives gave the various agencies the focus and the resources they needed to speed up the implementation dramatically. As Russ Bond, MassHighway ITS, stated, "[The DNC] has been a great compelling reason for agencies to drop their previous turf issues to work together."

Along with the underlying spirit of cooperation came the pooling of resources to deploy MIVIS. The project utilized funds from the Department of Homeland Security that were distributed to each state for security improvements (\$560,000 from a DHS grant to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety); an ITS Congressional earmark for the city of Boston (\$560,000); and 20% matching funds from MassHighway (\$330,000). The MIVIS remains in place and will continue to be a valuable system for transportation and security uses. Other agencies, such as Massport and MassPike, have expressed interest in signing the MIVIS MOU and joining the system, which will only increase its effectiveness.

### **7.3.2 Long-term Benefits**

**A large-scale special event can produce long-term benefits for day-to-day transportation operations, within an agency and among agencies.**

Agency staff perceived a range of long-term benefits:

- Improved security and response procedures
- Unifying experience for agency staff and management
- Better understanding of the public's travel patterns and attitudes
- Greater appreciation for other agencies' perspectives and capabilities.

Many examples can be cited within agencies. MBTA management saw a longer-term benefit, for instance, as Anne Herzenberg, Chief Operating Officer, pointed out. "It helped all the internal divisions – they worked better on this than anything I can remember. There was an acknowledgement that nobody was in charge and nobody has all the answers – it was an all-hands-on-deck approach." In addition, she highlighted that the planning and operation for the DNC enabled them to practice and refine procedures for security alerts in the future. Now they know how to handle sustained threat situations much better than before the DNC. They also learned that people would change their travel patterns if given enough information, and incentive.

At the Tobin Bridge, Mary Jane O'Meara, Director of the Tobin Bridge, spoke about the atmosphere created by the DNC – people working together for a common cause. Additionally,

senior management, union leaders, and workers collaborated on planning maintenance work during the times the bridge was closed to non-essential traffic.

Commonwealth Development Director Doug Foy spoke about the greater appreciation that both “sides” – transportation and security – had for each other after the event was over. It was also, he pointed out, a chance for individual agencies to market their capabilities. Chuck Sterling of the MassPike pointed out that it was a wonderful unifying experience for the agency’s staff. “We tried to expose as many of the new staff people so they can gain the experience.”

Russ Bond at MassHighway noted that what was exciting for him was that the MIVIS will be available for them to use after the DNC for managing special events, such as the Boston Marathon and other major sporting events. (See Section 7.3.1 for more on the MIVIS.)

### 7.3.3 Creative Thinking

**An agency can use a forced closure to its advantage.**

While the Central Artery, Tobin Bridge, and North Station were closed, managers of several transportation agencies took advantage of the opportunity to schedule work to maintain or improve infrastructure. Two of these organizations were Massport, which operates the Tobin Bridge, and Amtrak, which operates the Downeaster train from North Station to Portland, Maine.

When the Tobin Bridge management learned that the bridge would be closed at night during the week of the DNC, in concert with union leaders and members, they decided to make lemonade with their lemons. Together, they developed a plan to accelerate some maintenance and rehabilitation work. The Tobin Bridge is 2 1/4-miles long and connects the Charlestown section of Boston and the city of Chelsea. Access to the bridge is gained from I-93 from the south and SR 1 from the north. The DNC transportation operations plan designated that the upper, southbound level was to close nightly from Monday to Thursday, and the lower, northbound level was to remain open. However, the lower level would essentially be closed as well, because the ramps leading in to it from I-93 were in the section of I-93 that was closed to traffic at night. Drivers, therefore, could not use the ramps.

From Monday to Thursday, staff worked double shifts starting 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. the next morning. During the four five-hour closures, management estimated that workers completed work that normally would have taken two weeks. Work was accelerated because there was no conflict between workers and vehicles, and therefore, no detours or lane closures were needed. Figure 11 shows workers making repairs to the bridge deck pavement. Workers de-greased the tollbooth and the road surface around it,



**Figure 11. Tobin Bridge repairs**

replaced 36 light fixtures, repaired numerous potholes, installed conduit for an electronic signing project, cleaned gutters, and painted traffic control lines. Furthermore, the closures afforded the opportunity to train new workers in a variety of tasks and in a shorter period of time. While maintenance was going on, staff had to keep the roadway accessible for emergency vehicles and had to be prepared to mobilize if needed. Staff ensured that approximately a half dozen ambulances were able to use the bridge safely when it was closed to non-emergency vehicles. Because staff always had to be available in case of an emergency, bridge management took care of another detail – they provided meals for the workers and for the law enforcement officers assigned to the bridge.

Similarly, Amtrak took advantage of the cancellation of service of the Downeast service for the week of the convention. Crews completed track work during this time to make improvements to the track and rail bed so that trains would be able to operate at speeds up to 79 miles per hour.

## 7.4 Communication with the Public

The pre-planning modeling had made it clear that the only way the imposed security constraints could work was if vehicle traffic could be reduced by 50 percent during the DNC. Could half of the driving public be persuaded to change their normal commuting pattern? Their options included using public transit, commuting to other office locations, shifting times, and telecommuting. Given the time of year (July), taking a vacation was another viable alternative. All the agencies realized that a clear, coordinated, and consistent message must be communicated to the public and the media using all available tools and technologies. DNC planners tested the theory that if given enough information to make an informed decision, people will act in their own self-interest. They mounted a timely, coordinated effort to communicate the options to the general public – and they succeeded.

Members of the DNC Host Committee spoke with planners from the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympics, who stressed the importance of communication, that the public information campaign is crucial to the success of an event. The Olympic’s representatives also highlighted an important distinction – there is a difference between communicating information about the event’s activities, in this case the DNC, and information about transportation during the event, namely traffic and transit conditions. This second message is key, they reinforced, and should be done separately so that it does not get lost in all of the other information being given out about the event.

To send this message, transportation and public officials used multiple communication channels including the media, public meetings and forums, printed and electronic documents, notices in newspapers, radio, television, highway message signs (Figure 12), and the Internet. The following sections discuss the



**Figure 12. Temporary highway sign**

steps and methods that were used to communicate with the public and the media, and how advanced technologies were also used to communicate critical, current information.

In addition to focusing on the regional population, efforts were made to reach travelers outside of the Boston region. Working with the I-95 Corridor Coalition, special emphasis was given to communicating closings and diversions to trucking companies and interstate bus operators. Members posted messages about the convention on their own websites and VMS boards.

The coordinated communication effort was successful. When it was over, representatives from the city, state, and federal transportation and security agencies gave a collective sigh of relief. “We wanted to get volumes down 50 percent and we succeeded beyond our wildest dreams,” said Charles Sterling, MassPike. “This wasn’t a conspiracy to lie to the public. If we didn’t knock those volumes down, it would have been Armageddon around here. The public was provided the information, and they made decisions based on enlightened self interest.”<sup>2</sup>

#### **7.4.1 Public Relations**

**All other preparations for a special event are meaningless if the traveling public is not well informed ahead of time about what to expect and what their choices are.**

The media began to hint in late 2003 that the DNC impacts could be severe. But after a kick-off press conference on March 31, 2004, where preliminary plans for closures and restrictions were announced, the hinting was over. The media message was that July’s Democratic convention would bring a potential nightmare scenario for Boston commuters with shutdowns of North Station and the Central Artery.<sup>3</sup>

**Coordinating the transportation message.** Once the word was out that the DNC would cause significant changes in the life of metropolitan Boston residents and commuters, highway and transit officials went public with the details. Using a tag team approach, they went to chambers of commerce, public meetings, meeting with public officials and any other medium available to get the message out. In order to ensure that the transportation changes were not lost in the overall communications effort by the DNC, the DNC Host Committee routed all transportation issues and communications through one person hired to handle transportation issues.

**Convincing the public of the need to change travel patterns.** In the case of the DNC, two sets of information were essential. First, the public needed information about the absolute necessity of changing travel patterns to avoid gridlock and public safety problems. As Chuck Sterling of the MassPike stated, “good PR is essential – inform the public about what is going to happen – if you don’t change your travel patterns, stuff will happen.” Major Michael Mucci, of the State Police, echoed that sentiment, saying, “The outreach program was really key.” Given the significance of the transportation impacts on a regional roadway system, Mr. Sterling also noted that public relations efforts couldn’t be limited to automobile and bus commuters; the trucking industry must also be included. So, prior to the DNC, transportation officials met with trucking

---

<sup>2</sup>Boston Globe, *Officials Defend Traffic Measures*, July 31, 2004

<sup>3</sup> Boston Herald, *Dems the Brakes: DNC will shut down I-93 – and North Station too*, March 31, 2004


companies and interstate and regional bus carriers to discuss alternate routes into and through the city, and modified delivery schedules.

**Informing the public of the travel alternatives.** The second set of information the public needed concerned changes in transportation services, including road closures, transit services suspended during the DNC, and new or expanded alternative transit services. The public needed this information in order to consider and plan for their DNC-week travel. For example, the MBTA created and distributed 500,000 copies of a brochure entitled: *Taking the T During the DNC* (Figure 13). This publication contained detailed information on MBTA service changes, across all modes, for the duration of the DNC. The booklet provided to the public information for all pertinent MBTA service adjustments related to the DNC.

In addition to handing out the brochure to travelers at major transit stations, MBTA personnel met with chambers of commerce throughout the Boston metropolitan region, as well as with the traffic reporters from SmartTraveler, to be certain that these groups would help publicize and distribute the brochures. MBTA General Manager Mike Mulhern spoke on local TV stations about the brochure, holding it up and telling people where they could get a copy. The MBTA also posted the brochure on its website, along with updated DNC-week schedules for each of the various MBTA transit modes.



**Figure 13. Cover of an MBTA brochure announcing service changes**



**Figure 14. Boston Walk map**

While the highway message was to find alternatives to the car, or stay home, the transit message was to use the MBTA as the alternative. As Joe Pesaturo, the MBTA press secretary, said, “The key of the success was the education campaign prior to the event. Get good information in the hands of people and they will make their decisions.” He only regretted that more people didn’t try the substitute service. “Go back to every interviewee, and you will not find an interview that said you should stay away from transit. No one from the T discouraged any riders. The highway people were saying we need 50 percent less travel in vehicles.”

Convention delegates were also targeted. In an effort to promote walking between the delegate’s hotels and the convention center, WalkBoston, a non-profit advocacy group, worked in coordination

with the City of Boston and the DNC Host Committee and produced a walking map that was distributed at the hotels (Figure 14). Volunteers were also posted at key intersections distributing the map.

**Coordinating with the media.** The media obviously played a key role in communicating to the public. Agencies coordinated strategically with the media, but there can be a downside to that relationship. As Jeff Larson from SmartTraveler pointed out, “the media is important to get the information out, but once it gets out it is hard to control...as much as the initial announcement, you need to make sure the information remains accurate and you are steering that information.”

He also honed in on the point about the crucial nature of the public outreach effort, “If the technologies are fully functioning and operating as efficiently as possible, you will still fail if you don’t have an adequate public outreach informing the public and giving them knowledge. It is a huge audience and you really have to blanket the coverage. Radio, television, pamphlets, everyone needs to know the information is there.”

Because of the comprehensive public outreach through all the various channels of communications, a majority of commuters made changes in their trip to Boston. Because vehicular traffic was so light during the week and no major congestion occurred, Boston officials defended their campaign in response to a Boston Globe article about whether the agencies overreacted. “We weren’t trying to alarm people”, said Boston Police Department Commissioner Kathleen O’Toole. “But we’d be irresponsible if we didn’t plan for a worst-case scenario.”<sup>4</sup>

## 7.4.2 Using Technology to Communicate

**Numerous types of technology should be used to communicate to the public before and during the event.**


The various agencies used existing ITS technology installed over the past two decades to better inform the public. This included the use of both permanent and temporary variable message signs (VMS), highway advisory radio, static sign boards, and an expansion of services from SmarTraveler, which provides real-time traffic information to the Boston traveling public under a contract with MassHighway. The Internet also proved to be a valuable tool.

Using its video cameras and those operated by the transportation agencies, SmarTraveler reporters were able to report on traffic conditions and share video feeds with the local television stations. Traffic conditions were constantly updated. SmarTraveler issued updates as often as every 10 minutes during the convention, and local news media broadcasted extra coverage for commuters. (See Appendix E for information about SmarTraveler and SmartRoutes, Inc.)


Calls to SmarTraveler’s interactive voice response (IVR) telephone system increased in the weeks preceding the DNC (Figure 15) and peaked at 42,000 calls on the first day of the DNC. Total call volumes in July exceeded 750,000, as compared with a baseline of approximately 500,000. The use of the Internet to convey information also played a crucial role. SmarTraveler’s Boston traffic website received over 2.5 million page views during the month of the DNC, greatly exceeding website use for any of the preceding three years (Figure 16).

---

<sup>4</sup>Boston Globe, *Officials Defend Traffic Measures*, July 31, 2004



**Figure 15. SmarTraveler telephone daily usage, July 2004**



**Figure 16. SmarTraveler Website usage, 2001 - 2004**

The MBTA's website proved to be an excellent venue for distributing DNC-related information on transit. The MBTA website experienced significantly increased traffic during the DNC week. Travelers visited the website to view and to download commuter rail and subway schedules for the DNC week and MBTA publications. Website use was up for the entire month of July as compared with July 2003. Website use peaked on July 26, 2004 the first day of the DNC, with 35,424 website visits and over 219,000 page views. The Table 2 shows MBTA website use for July 2003 and July 2004.

**Table 2. MBTA Website Visits, July 2003 and 2004**

	July 2003	July 2004	Percent Increases 2003-2004
<b>Visits</b>	591,690	730,885	24%
<b>Unique Visitors</b>	238,410	298,462	25%
<b>Page Views</b>	3,696,223	4,686,077	27%
<b>Website Hits</b>	124,932,563	174,155,660	39%

The MBTA's booklet *Taking the T During the DNC* was the most downloaded document: MBTA website visitors downloaded 84,389 electronic copies of the booklet during July 2004.

In addition to SmarTraveler, highway transportation officials also chose to get the message out in advance of the DNC by utilizing its permanently installed set of VMS throughout the region and renting additional electronic signs. These were to be found at the entrance of every major roadway into the Boston area, with information on hours of operations as well as warnings to expect major delays. In addition, MassHighway broadcast messages on its highway advisory radio systems throughout eastern Massachusetts.

## **7.5 Role of Technology**

Technology can play a significant role in managing special events. During the DNC, transportation and security officials relied on numerous types of technology to better plan and manage the transportation system. Technology allowed officials to inform the public of closures, diversions, and changes in service in the weeks leading up to the convention. It also allowed officials to better see and understand how the different components of the system were operating during the week.

### **7.5.1 Operations Centers**

**Operations centers can provide bases from which officials can manage operations and response activities needed during special events.**

Numerous agencies activated operations centers to monitor the transportation and security management and operations during the DNC. There were four types of operations centers used:

#### **Operations centers that operate daily to help manage the transportation system.**

The MBTA, MassHighway, the Central Artery, and the City of Boston all operate transportation operations centers on an ongoing basis. These centers continued to operate, but in most instances managers expanded their hours of operations and added additional staff to the center.

**Operations centers that were created specifically for the DNC.** The MACC, operated by the U.S. Secret Service, brought together key federal, state, and local agency officials as well as representatives of private utilities. There were also several municipalities that operated operations centers specifically during the DNC. The staff at these centers coordinated activities among municipal agencies; these centers also served as focal points for contacting outside agencies.

**Emergency operations centers that activate in times of crisis.** The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) activated the State Emergency Operations Centers to help coordinate any needed response by state agencies during the convention.

**Mobile command units.** Several state and federal agencies deployed their mobile command units into the field, which allowed officials to be located near the scene of an event (Figure 17).



**Figure 17. MBTA’s mobile emergency response vehicle**

Because the convention week was uneventful, the operations centers were not tested under extreme conditions. Each of the centers had its own role to play, and there were communications among the centers. But one concern raised by a number of state and local officials is that too many agencies operated a command post or operations center. One state official expressed a concern that “if a major incident occurred, it was not clear which command post would take the lead.” Several agency representatives also expressed the view that it was not clear whether the U.S. Secret Service’s center, the MACC, was a command center or a coordinating center.

Not all of the operations centers used the same event management software technology to keep officials informed about operational issues and possible situations. The state agencies used WebEOC<sup>®</sup>, a web-based emergency management communications software, while the federally operated MACC used a different type of emergency management software. Consequently, not everyone was seeing the same reports of incidents.

## **7.5.2 Benefits of Technology**

**Technology allowed officials to monitor situations and broadcast information in real time, allowing for better decision making.**

As part of its integrated VMS system, MassHighway is able to post and change messages on its permanent set of message boards almost instantaneously. The MIVIS video integration system allows officials from different agencies to view real-time images and video from multiple

locations. SmarTraveler is able to post changes in roadway or transit conditions instantaneously on its website and phone system. All of these installed types of technology help officials better manage the day-to-day transportation system and are extremely useful during a large-scale event.

In one example of how access to technology helped during the convention, the State Police were going to close a portion of the I-93/I-95 interchange north of Boston because of a concern about traffic backing up. But because they had access in the operations control center to real-time streaming video of that location in the field, they were able to determine that traffic was not a problem and left the interchange open.

When designing a system, sometimes the configuration of ITS technology for normal daily operations is not set up to respond to special events. An example of this is the City of Boston's traffic camera network. Boston Transportation Department Deputy Commissioner Jim Gillolly noted that the camera system, and how the cameras were grouped in the system, is set up to respond to daily traffic. But for a special event, city officials may want to be able to view different groupings of camera feeds to observe crowds or other conditions. In future upgrades to the city's video technology system, the Boston Transportation Department officials are planning to include the needs of special event planning into account when designing the ITS system.



**Figure 18. Video cameras mounted on traffic signal mast**

## 8. CONCLUSION

Several themes emerged from the review of transportation planning, management, and operations for the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Each of the agency staff members interviewed after the convention spoke about the difficulties and costs involved in planning for and managing the event. Each one of them also noted, however, that the magnitude of the planning effort forced them to work with different agencies, examine problems in new and diverse ways, and better understand the needs of their sister agencies. Representatives from several agencies noted the need to continue building upon the relationships that were established, as well as the desire to continue joint agency planning exercises. This will enable them to be better prepared for both planned and unplanned future events, and to better manage the day-to-day operations of the system. Although preparing for the DNC was a major challenge, all of those involved see that the results may bring many benefits.

**It is critical that concerns about securing the transportation infrastructure be addressed during the site selection process. Senior federal and state security officials should be part of the initial review process.**

When the city of Boston was awarded the 2004 Democratic National Convention, none of the transportation agency officials realized the enormous impact that hosting the convention would have on the city and the region. The location of the FleetCenter at the junction of major highway, transit, and water transportation networks is a positive, if the primary goal is to promote mobility. If security, on the other hand, were the primary goal, then it would be hard to find a location in Boston more vulnerable. The FleetCenter is next to a highly traveled Interstate highway, serves as the terminus of commuter and intercity rail lines, and has two subway lines running under it. If security officials had been included in the site selection process for the 2004 DNC, the FleetCenter may not have been chosen.

**While the management and operations of the transportation diversions worked without any major problems, most of the transportation officials interviewed expressed that they would have liked more time to plan for the closures and diversions.**

It was almost a year after the site selection before the discussion of closing I-93 and North Station became public. On October 30, 2003, both the *Boston Globe* and the *Boston Herald* ran articles about the possibilities of the major closings. It was not until March 31, 2004, that federal and state security and transportation officials briefed the media and public officials about the closures and restrictions. This gave the public and businesses only four months to plan for the most extensive series of transportation diversions in the history of the city. Because of the complicated interconnected set of roads, highways, and transit service, it was extremely difficult and time consuming to understand all the implications of what a closure would do to the rest of the system.

**With any large-scale event, the major players should realize that it takes several months for agency staffs to understand each other's requirements and resources. Time to develop this understanding should be built into the planning timetable.**

It became apparent early in the DNC planning process that different types of agencies had different types of objectives. During a large-scale event, a transportation engineer's primary

goal is to promote mobility while preserving safety. A law enforcement official's primary goal is to ensure the safety and security of the event and its attendees, even if that means restricting mobility.

During the planning for the convention, the federal, state, and local security officials would state what they wanted as end results, such as "I-93 free of traffic at 7:00 p.m." They would leave the operational planning details to the transportation experts. But it would take several iterations of plans for the engineers and security officials to understand what the cumulative impacts of those directives would mean. Even within the transportation community, it took time for the highway and transit officials to better understand each other's needs and resources. It took several months of working together on an almost daily basis for the security and transportation officials to better understand each other's perspective, requirements, and resources.

**The interagency relationships that were built while planning and hosting this large-scale special event should have a profound positive impact on the day-to-day management and operations of the region's transportation system.**

The governmental agencies within the Boston region have a history of rivalry and at times unwillingness to work cooperatively. This sometimes extends to the transportation agencies. But this event may be seen as a significant milestone, because all of the players were able to see the common purpose and pull together to plan, manage, and operate the system as one.

Jane Garvey, DNC Host Committee transportation leader, stated "everyone has a slightly different agenda but all the agencies were willing to leave their egos at the door to ensure the success of this event." The planning and hosting of the event required a huge commitment of resources: financial, personnel, and equipment. The managers at the different agencies were forced to work together and to compromise on their needs, and as a consequence, have gained a better understanding of each other.

**There should be a clear regional leader and a command structure that delineates the roles and responsibilities of each of the operations centers and how those operations centers will communicate with each other.**

For the DNC, there was no clear regional leader in charge of all components to ensure the smooth operation of the transportation system. This coordination of roles needs to include and occur across federal, state, regional, and local jurisdictions.

**The DNC provided the managers of multiple agencies a perfect venue to integrate their technology with other agencies and to build on that integration for future expansion of the ITS architecture for the Boston region.**

Over the past two decades, the various transportation agencies in the Boston region have incrementally invested in technology to help better manage and operate their own portions of the transportation system. During the weeks leading up to the event, SmartTraveler experienced the greatest use of its website and phone system in its 10-



**Figure 19. Camera used for MIVIS**

year history. The use of streaming video during the week allowed the State Police to make better-informed decisions when deciding when and how to close access to the roadway network.

The imperative to manage traffic during the DNC helped focus transportation agency officials on the need to better integrate their various installed technology and, moreover, to speed up the acquisition and implementation of a proposed project to integrate video feeds among safety and transportation agencies in the region. The MIVIS system was fast tracked and Phase 1 was implemented in time for use during the convention.

**For both large-scale events and day-to-day operations, transportation agency officials should explore ways to publicize as much information as possible, as quickly as possible, to allow the public to make informed choices.**

While the installed technology provided information and data to help staff better manage the system, this is only one component. It is crucial that the organizers and transportation officials provide that information to the public to allow everyone to make well-informed decisions. Jeff Larson, SmartTraveler Operations Manager stated, “the public outreach is so crucial. If the technologies are fully functioning and operating as efficiently as possible, you will still fail if you don’t have adequate public outreach informing the public and giving them knowledge.” Outreach methods should include the use of the media, agency websites displaying video, agency publications, public meetings, and other outside sources.



# APPENDICES

## Appendix A. List of Acronyms and Terms

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Amtrak	The common name for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation <i><a href="http://www.amtrak.com">http://www.amtrak.com</a></i>
Bulfinch Triangle	An area in proximity to the FleetCenter that has traffic restrictions in place during the DNC. Four streets border this area: Causeway, North Washington, and Merrimac, and New Chardon Streets.
CTPS	Central Transportation Planning Staff
DCR	Department of Conservation Resources
DHS	Department of Homeland Security - <i><a href="http://www.dhs.gov">http://www.dhs.gov</a></i>
DNC	Democratic National Convention - <i><a href="http://www.dems2004.com">http://www.dems2004.com</a></i>
EOPS	Executive Office of Public Safety
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration - <i><a href="http://www.faa.dot.gov">http://www.faa.dot.gov</a></i>
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency - <i><a href="http://www.fema.gov">http://www.fema.gov</a></i>
FleetCenter	The convention-sports arena complex used as the focus of DNC activities in Boston
GPS	global positioning system
HAR	highway advisory radio
HOC	highway operations center
HOV Lane	high-occupancy vehicle lane
ICS	Incident Command System
ITS	intelligent transportation systems
IVR	interactive voice response technology
K-9 Patrols	law enforcement and security units that include canines (dogs).
LNG	liquid natural gas
MACC	Multi-Agency Communications Center
MassHighway	Massachusetts Highway Department
MassPike	Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. This agency is responsible for I-90 (the Massachusetts Turnpike) plus the Metropolitan Highway System, which includes the Central Artery (I-93), the Ted Williams Tunnel (I-90), and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels (S.R. 1) - <i><a href="http://www.masspike.com">http://www.masspike.com</a></i>
Massport	Massachusetts Port Authority. This agency is responsible for the Port of Boston, Logan International Airport and other regional airports, and the Tobin Memorial Bridge - <i><a href="http://www.massport.com">http://www.massport.com</a></i>
MBTA	Massachusetts Bay Transportation Administration - <i><a href="http://www.mbta.com">http://www.mbta.com</a></i>

MEMA	Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
MIVIS	Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System
NSSE	National Special Security Event
PDA	personal digital assistant
T	transit (subway-light rail, bus, and ferry) system of the MBTA, sometimes commuter rail is also included.
TOC	transportation operations center
VMS	variable message sign
WebEOC <sup>®</sup>	Web-based emergency management software



## Appendix B. Chronology

### February 28, 2001

Day DNC Chairman Terry McAuliffe names Alice A. Huffman, as co-chair of the Site Advisory Committee. <http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### April 25, 2001

Day In a letter to RNC Chairman James Gilmore, McAuliffe states Democrats will hold their convention the week of July 18, 2004.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### September 11, 2001

9:00 a.m. Terrorist attacks on America occur

### October 16, 2001

Day DNC sends out letters to the 34 largest cities, inviting them to consider hosting the Democrats' 2004 convention. The introductory letter outlines preliminary general requirements.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### February 28, 2002

Day Democratic Convention Nominating Committee announces that 10 cities will receive RFPs to host the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Boston is included as one of the 10 cities.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### April 12, 2002

5:00 p.m. Deadline for submitting bids. Five cities submit proposals: Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, Miami, and New York City. Boston hands delivers proposal on April 12.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### May 22, 2002

Day Site Advisory Committee holds first meeting, studies proposals and decides it will visit Boston, Detroit, Miami, and New York. By mutual agreement, Baltimore's proposal was withdrawn.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### May 29, 2002

Day McAuliffe sends mayors of the four cities a letter notifying them that, "The Democratic Convention Nominating Committee is now actively considering the weeks of July 19, July 26, August 2, August 30 and September 6, 2004 for the start of our convention."  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### June 24-26, 2002

General Site Advisory Committee visits Boston.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

### August 2, 2002

General Site Advisory Committee has a follow-up visit to Boston (only other follow-up visit is Detroit on August 22, 2002). <http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

## **October, 2002**

General Massachusetts State Police have been planning with local law enforcement to coordinate efforts to secure the area if the DNC comes to Boston.

## **November, 2002**

General MBTA signs agreement with the City of Boston, Boston 2004, DNCC, and the New Boston Garden Corporation. Agreement includes commitment of 125 MBTA buses for delegate shuttles.

## **November 13, 2002**

Day Site Advisory Committee holds second meeting, recommends Boston to McAuliffe, who accepts the recommendation and announces Boston as the host city.

## **December 17, 2002**

Day Officials from Boston and the DNC sign the 97-page contract at FleetCenter.  
<http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/demconv04/dconvmain04.html>

## **May 2, 2003**

Day Preliminary coordination meeting held between Boston Police Department and MBTA Operations personnel. MBTA staff are directed that the "the General Manager has made it absolutely clear that commuter rail trains must have access to North Station."

## **May 27, 2003**

Day The Department of Homeland Security declares the Democratic National Convention in Boston as a National Special Security Event (NSSE).

## **July 9, 2003**

Day Preliminary list of DNC delegate hotels circulates.

## **August 25, 2003**

Day DNC Transportation & Security Subcommittee has started weekly meetings. The concept of closing commuter rail at North Station was mentioned as still being "on the table" by City Staff, but vehemently denied by MBTA staff.

## **September 4, 2003**

Day MBTA staff prepares first outline of contingency plan for North Station commuter rail closure.

## **October 30, 2003**

General Boston Globe and Boston Herald run first articles based on rumors that I-93 might be closed during the evenings; nothing is official, yet.

## **October 31, 2003**

General Document "Options Analysis" and accompanying PowerPoint presentation are created and encourage leaving North Station open with convenient pedestrian detours. Boston Police Department and U.S. Secret Service are advocating closing the station, or leaving it open with long pedestrian detours.

## **December 16, 2003**

Day Boston Police Department and U.S. Secret Service make it clear that their preference is for North Station to be closed. If it does remain open, pedestrians must take "the long walk" rather than

other more convenient pedestrian detours. Even if station is open, it may be closed at a moment's notice due to any credible threat.

### **January 2004**

Day MassHighway became involved in the planning at the behest of the Massachusetts State Police because one of MassHighway's roadways, I-93, cuts vertically through downtown Boston, passing right by the FleetCenter, where the Convention will be held. The U.S. Secret Service intends to restrict traffic within designated "hard" and "soft" zones around the Center.

### **February 26, 2004**

Day Internal MBTA Operations Committee begins regular meetings to finalize plans.

### **March 8, 2004**

Day MassHighway and others begin finalizing details of when road would be closed, when and where emergency lanes would be deployed.

### **March 11, 2004**

0639 GMT Madrid, Spain - bombs explode on several trains. Terrorist group claims  
(1:39 a.m. EST) responsibility. Elections following the event resulted in voting against the incumbent's party.

### **March 31, 2004**

Day Boston Police Department and U.S. Secret Service Officials brief media on transportation plan - including that I-93 and North Station will be shut down during DNC.

### **April 2, 2004**

Day Commissioner Kathleen M. O'Toole told mayors in the Boston area that Boston Police Department expect I-93 to be shut down between 7 pm and 11 pm during the four days of the DNC, allowing much of the rush-hour traffic to pass before closure.

### **April 26, 2004**

General MBTA meets with City of Lynn to discuss staging of Newburyport/Rockport shuttle buses and the temporary use of the North Shore Community College lot.

### **May 3, 2004**

Day Interagency group holds workshop to confirm conceptual transportation plans and flesh out details between agencies.

### **May 6, 2004**

Day First draft of MBTA Service/Operating Plan released.

### **May 11, 2004**

General Transit marketing efforts ramp up. Staff begins developing information booklet, Ambassador program.

### **May 14, 2004**

Day MBTA Operations decides to close Haymarket after 3pm Mon-Thurs of convention due to threats of spontaneous roadway disruptions and due to ramp closures. Staff also looks to increase early afternoon express bus and south-side commuter rail service due to concerns with lost south-side highway capacity and with commuters shifting trips earlier in day.

## May 17, 2004

Day MBTA notifies AMTRAK that Downeaster service may not terminate at Oak Grove Station with a connection to the Orange Line due to railway capacity constraints. This decision, along with the AMTRAK customer surveys, which showed that most Downeaster passengers were not planning on traveling to Boston during the convention week, eventually leads to the decision to suspend Downeaster service during the convention.

## May 24, 2004

Day For the first time, senior federal, state and local transportation officials held a closed-door drill at the Boston Convention Center to study a simulation of a Madrid-like bombing of two MBTA commuter trains and discuss the logistical challenges of such an attack.

## June 8, 2004

General "Taking the T During the DNC" booklet is finalized and published on MBTA web site.

## July 14, 2004

Day Set of public meetings held by the City of Boston and Boston 2004, Inc. to provide up-to-date information on the transportation plan.

## July 21, 2004

12:00 and 6:00 p.m. Second set of public meetings held by the City of Boston and Boston 2004, Inc. to provide up-to-date information on the transportation plan.

## Thursday, July 22, 2004 and Friday, July 23, 2004

General The TSA is expected to staff over 50 extra people at terminal screening points. Logan International Airport is expected to register its busiest day ever on Friday.

## Friday, July 23, 2004

Day Final draft of Service/Operating Plan is released.

3:00 p.m. **Buses, general:** Routes 6, 92, 93, and 111 will not run after 3:00 pm. Routes 325, 326, 352, 354, 355, 424, 426, 428, 434, 441, 442, 450, and 455 will terminate at South Station after 3:00 pm and not serve Haymarket or State Street Stations.

8:00 p.m. **North Station commuter rail, transit and bus lines, and Lovejoy Wharf ferry service:** North Station will be closed until Friday, July 30, some time in the afternoon. Lovejoy Wharf, near North Station will also be closed - commuters will be diverted to Long Wharf.

**Transit:** Orange line - trains will not stop at North Station. Stepped-up security measures are enacted. Green line - ends at Haymarket, buses shuttle to Lechmere from Kendall/MIT. All lines - trains will run a 'peak hour' schedule all week.

**Trains:** All trains that normally end at North Station will be rerouted. Fitchburg Line - will terminate at Porter Square and riders will be diverted onto the Red Line. The Lowell Line will terminate at Anderson RTC in Woburn and be directed to buses that will travel on the dedicated I-93 lane to South Station. Commuter riders closer to Boston will ride an extension of Express Bus #326 to Haymarket before 10:00 am and returning from South Station after 3:00 pm. Haverhill Line will terminate at Oak Grove, and riders will be diverted onto the Orange Line.

Newburyport/Rockport line - riders will be diverted at Lynn to MBTA buses to South Station before 10:00 am and to Blue Line trains at Wonderland Sta. after 10:00 am. Trains will be added to some trains that end at South Station.

## Sunday, July 25, 2004

General **Lane Reductions/Restrictions:** No HOV lane on I-93 south from Woburn (I-95/MA-128) to Boston through Friday, July 30. No 'Zipper lane' on I-93 north from Braintree to Boston. One of the lanes on the Mass. Pike from the Allston tolls through East Boston will be closed to traffic.

Each of these lanes will become a dedicated lane for emergency vehicles and MBTA and authorized buses, available 24 hours on each day.

## Monday, July 26, 2004

General

**Logan Express Bus service:** 15 minute service will operate for Braintree, Framingham, and Woburn (subject to traffic conditions), with a regular 1/2 hour weekday schedule for Peabody, from Monday through Thursday. Also during this period, trips from Logan to each of the four branches, at 12:30 and 1:00 am, were added. The last trip from a branch to Logan is still 11 pm.

**MBTA bus:** Route 4 - World Trade Center to North Station will not run.

**Air Restrictions:** FAA Temporary Flight Restriction in effect. Summary: Restrictions on aircraft communications and travel within 30 miles of the DNC. No aircraft, with certain exceptions, is allowed to fly within 10 miles of DNC.

12:01 a.m.

**Water Travel:** The locks will close and will remain closed until July 30, 2:00 am.

4:00 p.m.

**I-93:** I-93 South will be closed at exit 32 in Medford (Route 60). All southbound traffic will be diverted off at that point. All southbound on-ramps from Woburn to Boston will be closed, while all off-ramps to exit 32 will remain open. All northbound lanes will remain open. I-93 north will be closed at exit 20 (the Mass Pike and South Station). All northbound traffic will be diverted off at that point. All northbound on-ramps from Braintree to Boston will be closed, while all off-ramps to exit 20 will remain open. All southbound lanes will remain open.

**US-1 and Tobin Bridge:** US-1 South will be closed at Route 16. All southbound traffic will be diverted at that point. All southbound on-ramps after Route 60 will be closed, while all off-ramps to Route 16 will remain open. All northbound traffic on US-1, including the Tobin Bridge, will remain open at all times.

**Sumner/Callahan Tunnels:** Tunnels will be closed. The Ted Williams Tunnel is the alternate route.

**Leverett Connector:** Leverett Connector will be closed in both directions, and all access points will be closed.

**Storrow Drive:** Storrow Drive eastbound will be closed at Western Avenue. Traffic will be diverted onto the Mass Pike, onto Western Ave. or back onto Storrow Drive west.

**Memorial Drive:** Memorial Drive eastbound will be closed at the Reid Overpass (BU Bridge). Traffic will be diverted over the BU Bridge into Boston, into Cambridge, or back onto Memorial Drive westbound.

## Friday, July 30, 2004

12:01 a.m.

**Roads:** All roads and exits remain open.

2:00 a.m.

**Waterways:** Charles River Locks reopen.

Afternoon

North Station reopens. All commuter train and transit service resumes normal schedule. Lovejoy Wharf also reopens.

General

**Airport, including airport shuttle service:** The next peak in passenger travel is Friday. 15-minute bus schedule ends for Braintree, Framingham, and Woburn branches. A regular 1/2 hour weekday schedule is in effect with extra buses on "standby."

## Saturday, July 31, 2004

General

All HOV and zipper lanes will operate as normal.







## **Appendix D. Agencies Represented in the Study**

- Boston Metropolitan Planning Organization
- City of Boston
- City of Medford
- City of Quincy
- City of Somerville
- Democratic National Convention Committee- Boston Host Committee
- Federal Highway Administration
- Federal Transit Administration
- Massachusetts Commonwealth Development Office
- Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
- Massport
- MassHighway
- MassTurnpike- Central Artery
- Massachusetts State Police
- Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
- SmartRoutes



## Appendix E. SmartRoutes

---

Name:	<b>SmartRoute Systems, Inc.</b>
Facilities:	Traffic observation and reporting operations center
Location:	Headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts
Responsibility:	Gathering traffic information and providing up-to-date traffic reports and advisories for the Boston metropolitan area.

---

### Facts About the Organization

- Provides real-time highway traffic and transit information as well as local weather forecasts for the Boston area under a contract with MassHighway under the name of SmarTraveler.
- Provides information through television, radio, and interactive web pages on partner websites (such as [www.boston.com](http://www.boston.com) and [www.thebostonchannel.com](http://www.thebostonchannel.com)), or the SmarTraveler interactive telephone system at 617-374-1234 (or \*1 on wireless phones).
- Is part of the Westwood One Company. Westwood One provides real time traffic information in 83 U.S. cities and is based in New York, N.Y.
- MassHighway has encouraged use of SmarTraveler by posting signs on the highway that direct drivers to dial \*1 on their cell phones to reach SmarTraveler.

### ITS Data Collection Capabilities

- *Camera images* - SmartRoutes has 50 + cameras available to them strategically placed to view highways where bottlenecks commonly occur. In addition to their own cameras, they have video feeds from MassHighway and Metro Networks (a sister company to SmartRoutes).
- *Scanners* – SmartRoutes regularly monitors the police and emergency response channels for news of accidents and other traffic related information.
- *Wireless phones* – The SmarTraveler interactive telephone system has an option where a caller can contact the SmarTraveler Operations Center to report traffic information.
- *Mobile units* – About 700 vehicle drivers, 600 of them public volunteers, distributed throughout the Boston area, report traffic conditions on highways via wireless phone to the SmarTraveler Operations Center. Mobile units include livery drivers, bus drivers, commuters, and other people who are frequently on the road. SmartRoutes tries to get to know their mobile unit drivers. By doing this, they develop a trust that the information that they receive from them is reliable. Many of these volunteers have been since the beginning in 1991.
- *Radios* – People can contact the operations center through two-way radios in addition to wireless phones.
- *Public agencies* – SmartRoutes has access to information directly from the MBTA operations center and has approval to access certain information from police highway emergency computer data (not sensitive to their operations).
- *Aircraft* – Two fixed-wing aircraft patrol the highways to observe traffic from the air, logging over 12 hours of flying each day. They also have available a feed from one helicopter owned by Metro Networks.

## ITS Information Management

- Proprietary, developed in-house; software is used to manage traffic information. Information is entered into a TOPS database of eastern Massachusetts roadways. The changes made in the database are automatically updated to the pages on their website. Their SmarTraveler IVR system is managed by proprietary Odyssey software. A small staff maintains the operations center, and processes the information. In addition, they have two people who are dedicated to recording their voices for the IVR on traffic reports and advice to get around situations.

**Table 3: SmarTraveler Monthly Telephone Usage, 1998-2004**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Average
<b>Jan</b>	234,274	324,982	303,939	342,455	362,836	382,885	390,919	334,613
<b>Feb</b>	197,411	227,778	273,276	285,489	278,618	359,713	344,050	280,905
<b>Mar</b>	227,089	276,880	274,518	377,802	333,524	402,121	414,204	329,448
<b>Apr</b>	239,265	284,025	274,045	302,289	333,859	409,337	472,732	330,793
<b>May</b>	295,510	369,269	363,902	405,049	475,380	481,643	568,046	422,686
<b>Jun</b>	355,730	405,608	444,514	456,539	481,820	514,251	652,871	473,048
<b>Jul</b>	384,026	402,461	407,511	474,773	556,109	646,919	752,785	517,798
<b>Aug</b>	326,879	380,663	424,840	491,124	591,317	623,100	669,175	472,987
<b>Sep</b>	319,368	413,412	409,445	418,057	506,106	606,340	711,044	445,455
<b>Oct</b>	351,708	354,135	437,680	436,053	524,517	638,872	608,972	457,161
<b>Nov</b>	290,032	324,097	347,875	426,609	455,195	485,329		388,190
<b>Dec</b>	275,324	297,780	310,823	345,157	441,619	451,716		353,737

**Table 4: SmarTraveler Monthly Web Usage, 2001 to 2004**

	<b>Calls</b>
<b>January 2001</b>	503,918
<b>July 2001</b>	486,355
<b>January 2002</b>	563,637
<b>July 2002</b>	911,550
<b>January 2003</b>	855,462
<b>July 2003</b>	991,778
<b>January 2004</b>	1,043,291
<b>June 2004</b>	980,250
<b>July 2004</b>	2,502,001



## Appendix F. Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System (MIVIS)

---

Name:	<b>Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System (MIVIS)</b>
Facilities:	A control center that has access to up to 1000 video camera feeds
Location:	Boston area
Responsibility:	Provides a link for member agencies to access strategic traffic locations throughout the state.

---

### Facts About the Organization

- Was planned for years, but the urgency was not there to allocate the resources to actually make it happen. The net result was that different agencies planned and implemented their own operations centers that did not share information.
- Preparation for the Democratic National Convention provided the impetus to speed development and implantation of a unified, seamless way to access video coverage.
- Operated by MassHighway.
- Initial funding from Department of Homeland Security, FHWA ITS earmark funds, and state funding.
- Participants in the system during the DNC included: MassHighway, SmarTraveler, the city of Boston, MBTA, and the Massachusetts State Police.
- Remains active beyond the DNC. Other agencies have considered joining the system, including Massport and MassPike.

### ITS Data Collection Capabilities

- *Camera images* – Several hundred cameras throughout the commonwealth are accessible through this system. Capable of displaying still images, streaming video, and GIS maps.

### ITS Information Management

- *Traffic management center* – video could be displayed at both permanent management centers and temporary centers.
- *PDA's* – 30 PDAs were used by transportation officials and law enforcement officers.
- *Video images from fixed cameras as well as live feeds from helicopters were utilized.*



## **Appendix G. Incident Command System and Unified Command**

Managing a major response – especially a complex, multi-jurisdictional response – is one of the most important challenges facing the National Response System (NRS). Effective coordination among local, state, and federal responders at the scene of a response is a key factor in ensuring successful responses to major incidents. An Incident Command System/Unified Command (ICS/UC) is an efficient on-site tool to manage all emergency response incidents, and UC is a necessary tool for managing multi-jurisdictional responses to oil spills or hazardous substance releases. Understanding the concepts of ICS/UC is as important for local responders, who generally arrive on-scene first and thus are most likely to implement the management system, as it is for state and federal organizations that may be joining the ICS/UC.

### **What is an Incident Command System?**

ICS is a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to allow responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.

In the early 1970s, ICS was developed to manage rapidly moving wildfires and to address the following problems:

- Too many people reporting to one supervisor
- Different emergency response organizational structures
- Lack of reliable incident information
- Inadequate and incompatible communications
- Lack of structure for coordinated planning among agencies
- Unclear lines of authority
- Terminology differences among agencies
- Unclear or unspecified incident objectives

In 1980, federal officials transitioned ICS into a national program called the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), which became the basis of a response management system for all federal agencies with wildfire management responsibilities. Since then, many federal agencies have endorsed the use of ICS, and several have mandated its use.

An ICS enables integrated communication and planning by establishing a manageable span of control. An ICS divides an emergency response into five manageable functions essential for emergency response operations: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration. Figure 1 shows a typical ICS structure.

### **What is a Unified Command?**

Although a single Incident Commander normally handles the command function, an Incident Command System (ICS) organization may be expanded into a Unified Command (UC). The UC is a structure that brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all major organizations involved in the incident in order to coordinate an effective response while at the same time carrying out

their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC links the organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum for these entities to make decisions based on consensus. Under the UC, the various jurisdictions and agencies and non-government responders may blend together throughout the operation to create an integrated response team.

The UC is responsible for overall management of the incident. The UC directs incident activities, including development and implementation of overall objectives and strategies, and approves ordering and releasing of resources. Members of the UC work together to develop a common set of incident objectives and strategies, share information, maximize the use of available resources, and enhance the efficiency of the individual response organizations.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration  
<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/about.html>




Figure 20. ICS Organizational Chart

## Appendix H. MBTA Ridership During the DNC

	Monday, July 26		Tuesday, July 27		Wednesday, July 28		Thursday, July 29	
	Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership	Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership	Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership	Daily Ridership	Percent of Baseline Ridership
<b>Subway</b>								
AM Peak Inbound	64,900	88%	67,100	94%	65,200	92%	67,500	95%
Early PM Peak Outbound	41,100	92%	44,000	98%	42,900	96%	40,700	91%
Late PM Peak Outbound	36,300	66%	44,000	80%	41,400	75%	38,400	70%
<b>Express Bus</b>								
AM Peak Inbound	3,526	118%	3,303	110%	2,757	92%	2,980	99%
Early PM Peak Outbound	1,317	120%	1,230	112%	1,151	105%	1,216	111%
Late PM Peak Outbound	1,334	74%	1,755	98%	1,455	81%	1,430	79%
<b>Local Bus</b>								
AM Peak Inbound	30,035	98%	30,363	99%	27,196	88%	25,448	83%
Early PM Peak Outbound	21,000	100%	14,024	67%	18,944	90%	18,357	87%
Late PM Peak Outbound	19,969	77%	20,928	81%	18,531	72%	18,451	72%
<b>Commuter Rail North</b>								
AM Peak Inbound	5,300	33%	8,250	51%	4,700	29%	4,441	27%
Early PM Peak Outbound	1,800	82%	890	40%	1,005	46%	1,252	57%
Late PM Peak Outbound	2,900	25%	2,570	22%	2,830	25%	1,739	15%
<b>Commuter Rail South</b>								
AM Peak Inbound	33,400	88%	30,680	81%	29,480	78%	26,754	70%
Early PM Peak Outbound	5,200	95%	6,290	114%	5,390	98%	5,998	109%
Late PM Peak Outbound	17,700	78%	21,000	93%	15,135	67%	14,320	63%

## Appendix I. NSSE Designations by DHS

The following is a press release from the Department of Homeland Security announcing the designation of the 2004 Democratic National Convention as a National Special Security Event

### Fact Sheet: The Department of Homeland Security Partners With State and Locals to Protect Democratic National Convention

*Homeland Security Allocating Numerous Department Resources to Ensure Strengthened Security for National Special Security Event*

On May 27, 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced that the Democratic National Convention will be designated a National Special Security Event (NSSE) establishing the U.S. Secret Service, now part of the Department of Homeland Security, as the lead federal agency in charge of the design and implementation of the operational security plan. Over the course of the past year, numerous federal, state and local agencies have worked together to put in place an unprecedented level of security for the political convention. Working in partnership with state and local organizations, the Department of Homeland Security has invested substantial resources and numerous personnel to ensure a safe and secure event for the Boston community and all delegates attending the convention.

#### United States Secret Service (USSS)

- The U.S. Secret Service conducted comprehensive security assessments of all primary convention venues as well as hotels, hospitals, airports and other sites related to the convention.
- U.S. Secret Service coordinated multiple interagency training exercises and tested operational security plans to verify command and control protocols and procedures.
- For security reasons, specific methods of protection and preparation are not revealed; however, there is a tremendous amount of advance planning and coordination in the areas of venue, protection, airspace security, communication, emergency equipment, credentialing and training. Secret Service began developing the security plan for the Democratic National Convention in June 2003.

#### Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

- ICE Federal Protective Service (FPS) will deploy approximately 200 personnel to the Democratic National Convention to ensure public safety and continuity of operations at federal facilities within the Boston area. This deployment will also include Explosive Detector Dog teams, WMD/HAZMAT technicians, intelligence and undercover agents, uniformed officers, bicycle and motorcycle officers, and emergency response teams.
- ICE FPS will provide two Mobile Command Vehicles (MCV) to serve as highly advanced communication centers for multiple law enforcement agencies. Each MCV is equipped with the capacity to operate as primary or backup radio base stations for all levels of law enforcement, monitor video cameras from U.S. government facilities, retrieve different types of closed circuit video signals and receive real-time aircraft video feeds.
- ICE Office of Investigations will deploy a large number of Special Agents to the Democratic National Convention to support different security units assisting with convention activities and operations.

## **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

- FEMA is the lead agency responsible for consequence management for all National Special Security Events and will be in charge of providing emergency management coordination and any needed response and recovery assets.
- FEMA will support state and local emergency management services and first responder units by pre-deploying more than 400 emergency personnel to serve with Emergency Response Teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, a Mobile Emergency Response Unit and an Urban Search and Rescue Task Force.
- FEMA's Regional Operations Center will function 24 hours each day and is equipped and prepared to support the Massachusetts and Boston Emergency Management Agencies as well as the Federal Response Plan.

## **U.S. Coast Guard**

- As the primary federal maritime law enforcement agency, Coast Guard personnel will provide comprehensive waterside coverage on and over the water for the Democratic National Convention coordinating closely with state, local and other federal maritime law enforcement assets.
- Numerous Coast Guard units and personnel will be involved in this event including boat crews, law enforcement boarding teams, pilots and aircrew, support personnel and a wide variety of Coast Guard assets.
- Coast Guard helicopters will assist in security zone surveillance and enforcement as well as air interdiction efforts.
- The Coast Guard's Captain of the Port has worked closely with commercial shipping interests and other waterway users to minimize the effects of security zone enforcement on recreational boating, commercial fishing and the free flow of commerce into and out of the Port of Boston.
- The U.S. Coast Guard will establish a Waterside Security Unified Command Center in Boston to manage waterside security operations.

## **Customs and Border Protection (CBP)**

- Customs and Border Protection will provide inspectors to assist with overall security personnel as well as operate a mobile x-ray unit to examine suspicious packages entering a Convention facility.
- Customs and Border Protection will also provide x-ray equipment to scan commercial vehicles and delivery trucks such as food service providers as they enter the Democratic National Convention site.

## **Transportation Security Administration (TSA)**

- TSA conducted security and vulnerability assessments at affected commercial, general aviation and private airports as well as additional actions to enhance aviation security near Democratic National Convention sites.

- TSA will deploy approximately 100 personnel to sites at or near the Democratic National Convention to ensure security and communication capability between various modes of transportation.

### **DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)**

- During the Democratic National Convention, the Department's Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) will provide timely sharing of any threat information, intelligence, situational awareness and operational information pertinent to the security of the event through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN provides real-time connectivity and information sharing among all DHS components and State and Local partners.
- IAIP conducted several training courses in the Boston area to provide local law enforcement officials with additional skills and protective measures. Courses included Terrorism Awareness and Prevention Training for liquefied natural gas facilities and rail transit systems, and Soft Target Awareness Training for owners, operators, and senior staff members of stadiums and arenas, places of worship, shopping malls, hotels and other large buildings.
- IAIP is working with the state of Massachusetts Office of Public Safety to distribute radiation detection pagers to state and local law enforcement with operational responsibilities for the Convention. Training will be provided to law enforcement members by Infrastructure Protection staff preceding the event in coordination with the state homeland security adviser's office.

### **DHS Science and Technology (S&T)**

- In coordination with the U.S. Secret Service, S&T is deploying air-monitoring equipment to detect airborne biological pathogens during the duration of the Democratic National Convention.

### **Federal, State and Local**

Additional federal, state and local agencies and departments are dedicating security resources to the Democratic National Convention:

- AMTRACK Police
- Boston Fire Department
- Boston Emergency Management Agency
- Boston Emergency Medical Support
- Boston Police Department
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
- City of Cambridge Fire Department
- City of Cambridge Police Department
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Federal Aviation Administration
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Federal Communications Commission
- Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
- Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
- Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety
- Massachusetts National Guard
- Massachusetts State Police
- Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- U.S. Attorney's Office
- U.S. Capitol Police
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration
- U.S. Marshals Service
- U.S. Park Police
- U.S. Postal Police
- U.S. Secret Service

**source:** DHS website: <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=3840>

**The following is a list of events that have been designated as a National Special Security Event:**

<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Date(s)</b>
1. World Energy Council Meeting	Houston, TX	September 13 - 17, 1998
2. NATO 50 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary Celebration	Washington, DC	April 23 - 25, 1999
3. World Trade Organization Meeting	Seattle, WA	November 29 - December 3, 1999
4. State of the Union Address	Washington, DC	January 27, 2000
5. IMF/World Bank Spring Meeting	Washington, DC	April 14 – 17, 2000
6. International Naval Review (INR)/OpSail	New York, NY	July 3 – 9, 2000
7. Republican National Convention	Philadelphia, PA	July 29 – August 4, 2000
8. Democratic National Convention	Los Angeles, CA	August 14 – 16, 2000
9. Presidential Inaugural	Washington, DC	January 20, 2001
10. Presidential Address to Joint Session of Congress	Washington, DC	February 27, 2001
11. UNGA 56	New York, NY	November 10 – 16, 2001
12. IMF/World Bank Fall Meetings (canceled)	Washington, DC	October 1 – 3, 2001
13. State of the Union Address	Washington, DC	January 29, 2002
14. Super Bowl XXXVI	New Orleans, LA	February 3, 2002
15. Winter Olympic Games	Salt Lake City, UT	February 8 – 24, 2002
16. State of the Union Address	Washington, DC	January 20, 2004
17. Sea Island G8 Summit	Sea Island, GA	June 8-10, 2004
18. Reagan State Funeral	Washington, DC	June 11, 2004
19. Democratic National Convention	Boston, MA	July 26-29, 2004
20. Republican National Convention	New York, NY	August 30 – September 2, 2004
21. Presidential Inaugural	Washington, DC	January 20, 2005